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The influence of special interests and the important role of the media in modern 
democracies are undeniable. In this dissertation, we employ different tools, namely game 
theory, experiments and models of political economy, to delve into this important 
problem.  In the first chapter, we approach this issue from a game-theory perspective. In 
an anonymous dynamic setting we add the assumption that there is a “planner”, who 
knows and selectively reveals aggregate information to maximize his objective function. xiii 
 
We find that this approach yields a useful refinement of self-confirming equilibrium. We 
also show that in some cases partial information revelation is optimal. Finally, our model 
indicates that affirmative action may be desirable, demonstrating the value of generating 
information about special social groups. In the second chapter we examine the effects of 
the release of aggregate information experimentally. We perform a series of experimental 
sessions of a version of the “centipede game” with aggregate information release. With a 
payoff structure similar to previous experiments, we find that revealing public 
information causes strong convergence to Nash equilibrium and leads to significantly 
lower aggregate payoffs. However, after slightly changing the payoff structure of the 
game, the effects of public information shift dramatically in the opposite direction. 
Theories that assume that people exhibit “conditional moral motivation” are supported by 
our results.  In the third chapter, we focus on the political economy aspect of the media 
and special interests. If the investment decisions of private firms determine economic 
growth and employment, voters have a common interest in making their governments 
commit to policies that encourage private investments. However, governing parties may, 
in general, renege on promises for economic stability. Campaign contributions by firm 
interests tend to restraint the scope of this opportunism and provide a commitment 
device. This is achieved if the private sector in the political game gets to move after the 
policy is chosen, contributing to the governing party or to its rivals. Anticipating this, the 
governing party will choose not to follow opportunistic policies and firms will choose a 
high level of investment and society as a whole may benefit.  
 1 
 
Chapter 1.  Selective Revelation of Aggregate Information and   
Self-Confirming Equilibrium 
 
1. 1 Introduction 
Social interactions among strangers can be modeled as games of large populations 
with anonymous matching.
1 The choices of a specific player who is matched against an 
opponent are based on the player’s expectations concerning the “average” behavior of the 
opponent’s population. However, people rarely have enough interactions with members 
of other populations in order to form accurate expectations about the behavior of all other 
social groups. The notion of self-confirming equilibrium (SCE) of Fudenberg-Levine 
(FL)  ) 1993 ( a describes a state where people optimize given their beliefs about other 
groups, but individual beliefs need not be correct about groups they do not interact with.
2 
Further, members of the same population may have different experience and hence 
different beliefs. The fact that some members of a given population interact with a social 
group does not necessarily mean that the other members of the population share their 
knowledge and have correct beliefs about the behavior of this group.  
 
                                                 
1 There is a large debate concerning the degree of sophistication of agents, since evolutionary models 
consider players “naïve learners”. See Mailath ) 1998 ( , who offers support for this hypothesis of 
evolutionary theories against its criticisms. We believe that relatively weak assumptions about the 
sophistication of players are enough to justify our results. We shall further discuss the degree to which 
assumptions of naiveté need to be invoked in our model.  
2 For example, people of one ethnic group may be brought up having strong prior beliefs that the members 
of another ethnic group hate them.  Consequently, they avoid interacting with that group. If this belief is 
wrong, it cannot be falsified, and hence is never corrected.  2 
 
However, governments and special interests often have asymmetric access to 
aggregate data about the behavior of social groups. By revealing their special information 
they may correct the beliefs of the public regarding the behavior of others, and possibly 
change people’s actions. Therefore, selective information revelation of aggregate data can 
become a powerful policy tool that the possessors of information can use to achieve their 
goals. This is especially relevant in modern societies, where agents directly learn 
information about the aggregate data through the media. This information need not 
necessarily be exogenous, because the availability of aggregate data depends on the 
incentives of those who have them to disclose them. In some sense, these possessors of 
information can choose what “wrong beliefs” can survive in the long-run. Accordingly, a 
given self-confirming equilibrium is plausible as the long-run state of the economy only 
if the possessors of aggregate information cannot choose a more preferred equilibrium for 
them, in the sense we shall define bellow. 
For a specific example, we ask the reader to look at Figure 1 . 1 . Assume that there 
are two social groups, investors and officials (player1’s and2’s, respectively). The 
investors move first, deciding whether to invest (denoted byE ) or not, and then officials 
choose whether to cooperate or not.
3 The investment is profitable only if the official 
cooperates. The numbers in the brackets show the fractions of the social groups making 
each action in the specific “state” of the dynamic system we are considering. One fifth of 
the investors have taken the risk of investing before, and they have leaned the truth: that 
the officials are upright, and they always cooperate ) (C without asking for a bribe. 
                                                 
3 When officials do not cooperate, they illegally try to expropriate rents from the investor. 3 
 
However,  % 80 of investors choose to refrain from investing, holding strong prior beliefs 
that the officials are corrupt. This state of affairs, being a SCE, is stable in the sense of 
FL,  a 1992 . 
 
We claim that this equilibrium is implausible. Although % 80 of investors are 
better off not investing given their priors, they would change their behavior if they knew 
the true behavior of officials. However, if the government possesses the data that reveal 
this behavior and wishes to maximize social surplus, it ought to reveal this information. 
Knowing the true data about corruption, it may announce the true behavior of officials 
through the media. Accordingly, the behavior of investors may change by observing the 
true data. Clearly, revealing the fact that officials are honest will induce investors to 
enter, upsetting the equilibrium. The new profile where all investors enter and all officials 
behave honestly is also a steady state because it is a self-confirming equilibrium. 
Moreover, the government prefers this steady state than the previous one, so it has the 
incentive to reveal this information. 













The Modified Cooperation Game 4 
 
The basic theoretical tool we employ is the notion of self-confirming 
equilibrium
4. The key idea is that if people do not experiment enough, aggregate play 
need not result in Nash equilibrium outcomes.
5 In our theoretical model, we simply add 
the existence of a “planner”, who knows and selectively reveals aggregate information to 
maximize his objective function, to the general framework of FL. Individuals do not 
know anything more about the behavior of other social groups than what personal 
experience teaches them, unless the planner reveals information, which is always 
perceived to be true. Our results have theoretical significance, but they are also important 
for policy proposals and for understanding several important social phenomena. Our key 
insight is that, deciding whether a particular self-confirming equilibrium with non-Nash 
outcomes is a plausible rest point for the dynamic social interaction, one should look at 
the incentives of those who have aggregate information.
6 This is because selective 
information release by the planner may upset a given self confirming equilibrium and 
lead the system into a different one.  Moreover, we show that aggregate information 
                                                 
4 See Fudenberg and Levine ) 1993 ( a , Hahn ) 1997 ( and Kalai and Lehrer ) 1993 ( . 
5 The main question that can be asked about SCE is: why would agents fail to experiment to learn the true 
behavior of others? One way to understand this is to acknowledge the fact that many decisions in life do not 
permit experimentation. For example, if some action of one social group results in the death of agents 
belonging to another group, these agents are not very likely to experiment with the social interaction.  
Alternatively, in many real decisions each player can move only once and for all. For example, a person 
decides only once whether to attend law school. Experimentation is not possible here without a high cost, 
and priors play a major role here. Of course, each player can be viewed as a part of a population who share 
some characteristics, like in Jackson and Kalai’s ) 1997 (  “recurring” games. Thus, one can learn from the 
previous experience of others, and this is exactly where selective information revelation can have a major 
role. Alternatively, a non-Nash SCE can be reached if there is a very large number of possible actions and a 
finite life span. For example, no customer has a comprehensive knowledge of which products in a given 
supermarket satisfy her preferences best, because nobody can try them all. This is a reason that selective 
information revelation is widely used by advertisers. 
6 We take the knowledge of aggregate statistics by the planner as given.  Our setting can easily take into 
account the cost of aggregate information acquisition as well as multiple “planners” with possibly 
conflicting interests.   5 
 
release can sometimes be beneficial for society, but not always. In particular, we show 
that “self-censorship” can be optimal in a wide range of games. Furthermore, information 
revelation requires “socially beneficial” data, so we show that information-generating 
“affirmative action” may be useful. Finally, our framework has a wide variety of 
applications in Industrial Organization, Political Economy, Public Policy and other fields.  
In the paper which is closer to our spirit, Esponda ) 2006 (  has a theoretical model 
that focuses on a specific type of games, namely first price auctions. He asks whether the 
equilibrium feedback policy, which in most cases may be decided by the auctioneer, may 
affect equilibrium outcomes. He thus provides a very specific example of a “planner” and 
shows how he selectively reveals information about the aggregate data to maximize his 
objective function. Here we generalize this approach to abstract extensive-form games. 
The literature on herding behavior and information cascades also raises the issue of 
aggregate information management. Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch ) 1992 ( , argue 
that fads that are due to information cascades are sensitive to aggregate information 
revelation because the agents use very few of the available signals. Jackson and Kalai 
) 1997 ( examine “recurring” games in which each player plays only once, but the same 
game is repeated with different players every time. Information revelation of aggregate 
play has substantial effects here, because each player learns something about herself 
when she gets information about the history of her group. Their conclusions regarding the 
benefits of “affirmative action” are similar to ours. 
 6 
 
The experimental literature has also addressed the issue of whether revealing 
aggregate information matters and whether expectations of agents can be manipulated. 
Roth and Schoumaker ) 1983 (  and Harrison and McGabe  ) 1996 (  directly manipulated 
subjects’ expectations about others’ play in an ultimatum game, with significant and 
lasting effects. Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe ) 1995 (  and Ortmann, Fitzgerald and Boeing 
) 2000 (  performed experiments of one-round trust games,
7 and found some support for 
the notion that information revelation of aggregate data can push the economy to 
desirable equilibria.
8 Similar results were found in Maniadis ) 2007 ( , Frey and Meier’s 
field experiment ) 2003 ( , Dufwenberg and Gneezy ) 2002 ( and Hargreaves–Heap and 
Varoufakis ) 2002 (.  
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In part two we introduce the 
model, following Fudenberg-Levine  ) 1993 ( a  and define Nash and self-confirming 
equilibrium. In part three we introduce the planner, define the notion of revelation 
unstable self-confirming equilibria and provide examples illustrating the definitions. A 
brief discussion of the plausibility of our assumptions follows in part four. In part five we 
discuss when equilibria cannot be improved upon with information revelation. Part six 
examines conditions under which concealing information (which we call self-censorship) 
makes sense. Part seven discusses  Partial-Revelation Improvable Self-Confirming 
                                                 
7 Each “sender” had 10$ that he could send to the receiver. The amount sent tripled, and then the receiver 
decided how much money to send back to the sender. 
8 They played the game once with some students, and subsequently they showed the data about the actions 
chosen to different students that were about to play the game on a different date. They found that 
information revelation about the same game played by different subjects does affect behavior in ways that 
increase social surplus. 7 
 
Equilibria. Examples and applications of our approach are in part eight. Part nine 
concludes.  
 
1.2 The Model 
In our model, we endogenize the information players get as play evolves. Our 
point of departure is Fudenberg and Levine’s approach  ) 1996 , 1993 ( a  in assuming that 
players see only the result of play in their own matches.
9 The framework of Fudenberg-
Levine ) 1993 ( a  is a dynamic setting with anonymous matching of agents that belong to 
different “population-roles”. Taking as given the main results of this research, especially 
the possibility of the game settling in a self-confirming equilibrium with non-Nash 
outcomes, we shall examine how a planner can convey the aggregate information he has, 
in the best possible way, in order to change the  equilibrium outcome. We shall show that 
some self-confirming equilibria are not plausible in the presence of the planner, because 
by selectively - but truthfully - revealing aggregate data, the planner can move the system 
to a different equilibrium outcome, preferable for him. In the presence of the planner, 
only some forms of wrong beliefs survive in the long run. 
 
1.2.1 The Extensive-Form Dynamic Game 
There is a given extensive-form game withI players. By Ιwe denote the set of all 
players. The game is played repeatedly among anonymous agents randomly matched with 
each other. They know the extensive form of the game, the realized terminal nodes of 
                                                 
9 An underlying assumption we use is that a fictitious play process describes the evolution of learning.   8 
 
their games after each match, and their payoffs at all terminal nodes, but not necessarily 
the payoffs of other players.  
The extensive-form game is as follows. There is a game tree X with finitely many 
nodes X x∈ . Nature’s move, if there is one, is at node zero. The terminal nodes of the 
tree are X Z z ⊂ ∈ . Information sets, which are a partition of }) 0 { ( ∪ − Z X , are denoted 
by H h∈ , and the subset of information sets where playeri has the move, by 
i HH ⊂ .We denote the set of feasible actions for playeriat information set i h  by ) ( i h A , 
and all possible actions of player iby ) ( U
i i H h
i i h A A
∈
= . We denote the player who moves at 
node xby ) (x ι . The functionlassigns for each noninitial nodexthe last action taken to 
reach it.   
A pure strategy for player i is a map  i i i A H s → :  satisfying ) ( ) ( i i i h A h s ∈ for all 
i i H h ∈ . Let  ) ( i H h i h A S
i i∈ × =  be the set of all such strategies. Strategy profiles specify a 
pure strategy for all players, and we denote such a profile by i
I
i S s
1 = × ∈ . A mixed strategy 
for player i is a probability distribution over pure strategies, ) ( i i S ∆ ∈ σ , and a profile of 
mixed strategies is denoted by ) (
1 i
I
i S ∆ × ∈
= σ . The payoff for each player depends on the 
terminal node. So for players  I i , , 2 , 1 L = the payoff function is  ℜ → Z ui :.   
Let ( ) i Hs  [ ) ( i s Z ]  denote the subset of all information sets [terminal nodes] 
reachable when agent iplays i s . ( ) H σ
−
denotes the set of information sets that are reached 9 
 
with positive probability underσ , and ) (σ
−
Z denotes the set of all terminal nodes that are 
reached with positive probability underσ . A behavior strategy i π for playeriis a map 
from the set i H , the family of all information sets where this player has the move, to 
probability distributions over moves. That is, )) ( ( ) ( i i i h A h ∆ ∈ π . Denote the set of all such 
strategies for player iwith  i Π and denote by i
I
i Π × ∈
=1 π a profile of behavior strategies. Let 
also i − Π be the space of behavior strategies for the players other thani. We assume 
perfect recall, so by Kuhn’s theorem, every mixed profile induces an equivalent profile of 
behavior strategies. Let 
^
(/) jj h π σ denote the distribution of actions at information set 
j h induced by mixed strategy  j σ for player j . Let also ( / ) pxπ be the probability that 
node  xis reached under the profile of behavior strategiesπ .  
Absent information revelation by the planner, players do not know the true 
distribution of play, so there is strategic uncertainty. Each player has beliefs over the 
aggregate distribution of play. These beliefs are described by a probability measure 
i µ on i − Π , the set of profiles of behavior strategies of other players. Given playeri’s 
beliefs i µ about other players’ behavior strategies, the probability that terminal node z is 
reached when player i chooses pure strategy  i s is ) ( ) , / ( ) , / ( i i i i i d s z p s z p
i
− Π − ∫
−
= π µ π µ  
Accordingly, the expected utility of an agent with beliefs  i µ when she plays strategy  i s is 








=  10 
 
In this environment, Nash equilibrium can be defined it terms of players’ beliefs 
for opponents’ behavior strategies. A Nash Equilibrium is a profile of mixed strategies 
σ such that for all  , i  and for all ∈ i s support ), ( i σ there exists beliefs 
i s µ such that: 
a)  i s maximizes  ) , (
i s i u µ ⋅  
b)  1 )] / ( ) ( : [
^
= = Π ∈ − − j j j j j i i s h h
i σ π π π µ for all i j H h − ∈  
Thus, a Nash equilibrium is the profile consisting of the best responses of agents 
to their beliefs about the aggregate distribution of play, where these beliefs are correct for 
every information set of the game. However, if players do not experiment enough, they 
may never get to know true play in all information nodes. They may end up in a situation 
where as far as they can tell, their actions are optimal, but without a necessarily correct 
assessment of play in information nodes that they do not reach given their strategies. 
This is captured by the following equilibrium notion: a self-confirming 
equilibrium is a mixed strategy profile σ such that for all i and all  ∈ i s support ) ( i σ there 
exists beliefs 
i s µ such that: 
a)  i s maximizes  ) , (
i s i u µ ⋅  
b) 1 )] / ( ) ( : [
^
= = Π ∈ − − j j j j j i i s h h
i σ π π π µ , for all  i j ≠  and ) , ( i i j s H h −
−
∈ σ  
This means that in a self-confirming equilibrium, a specific individual i must 
hold correct beliefs about the behavior of opponent groups only at nodes that are reached 
with positive probability given i’s strategy and the mixed profile of i’s opponents. Thus, 
an individual that belongs to population i may have wrong beliefs about the distribution 11 
 
of opponents’ play at information sets reached with positive probability by other players 
who belong to the same population i and choose a different strategy than the specific 
individual. In a SCE, only agents with the same “experience” in equilibrium are required 
to have the same beliefs.  
 
1.3 Revelation-Unstable Self-Confirming Equilibria 
We shall show that selective information revelation can “direct” the economy 
away from specific self-confirming equilibria. In this section we assume that there is a 
“planner” who maximizes his payoffs  ) (σ
PL U that depend on the long run “state”σ . The 
planner, who at any given time knows the true distribution of actions at each information 
set, can announce it at a subset of information sets.
10 His announcements are true and are 
always perceived as such.
11 Note that the planner has generic payoffs. For example, the 
auctioneer, who chooses the level of information feedback in an auction, wishes to 
maximize his revenue; a “benevolent government” maximizes social welfare, etc. In our 
motivating examples1,2and for our main results we will focus on the “benevolent 
government” interpretation. The main idea here is that if the planner can achieve a better 
social result than a given self-confirming equilibrium with aggregate information 
revelation, then this equilibrium is implausible.  
                                                 
10 This subset has to satisfy some properties we shall explain bellow.  
11 This can be though as a benchmark case for analysis. Our key insights would not change if we assume that a given 
fraction  α  of each subgroup believes the planner’s announcements, and another fraction  α − 1  ignores the 
announcements. Clearly, the quantitative results depend on the parameterα  , but the qualitative ones carry over if 
we assume that only some people believe the planner, so thatα is not zero. This assumption is more convincing in 
some real economies, such as advanced democracies, than others, such as totalitarian regimes. Note that by always 
selectively revealing true information, the planner can also develop a reputation for truth-telling.  12 
 
 
 1.3.1 The Full Information Revelation Setting 
We shall assume that for the equilibria we are discussing in this setting, 
H H =
−
) (σ . For full information revelation, information about play in all information sets 
should be available. Intuitively, if the planner wants to reveal the aggregate distribution 
of play at all information sets, then there must be data available for him to disclose. If, in 
a specific self-confirming equilibrium, an information set j h  is never reached, there is 
nothing to be announced about the behavior of player j ’s at this set. If this condition does 
not hold, then we can only have partial information revelation. 
Definition1
12: A self-confirming equilibrium σ  is full-revelation unstable 
relative to planner’s preferences, if there exists a mixed profile
* σ such that: 
a) For all iand for all  ∈ i s
* support ) (
*
i σ ,  i s
* maximizes  ) , (
*
i s i u µ ⋅ , where for each i and 
for all  ∈ i s
* support( i
* σ ), 
*
i s µ  satisfies  1 )} / ( ) ( : {
^
* = = Π ∈ − − j j j j j i i s h h
i σ π π π µ i j H h − ∈ ∀ . 
b) 
* σ is a Nash Equilibrium profile. 
c) ) ( ) (
* σ σ
PL PL U U > . 
d) ) , ( ) , (
* * *
i i s i i s i i s u s u µ µ > , for some i, some  ∈ i s support( i σ ), and some ∈ i s
* support( i
* σ ). 
                                                 
12 The notation  *
i s µ emphasizes the fact that, following information revelation, each pure strategy  i s  in the 
old equilibrium could be associated with different beliefs than different pure strategies of the same 
population. Note that for this particular definition, this notation does not make a difference, since all agents 
have the same (correct) beliefs. However, it matters in definition2which follows, since the new beliefs 
associated with each pure strategy  i s of the old equilibrium need not be correct in all nodes. 
 13 
 
This definition says that a self-confirming equilibrium is “full-revelation 
unstable” if an announcement of the true distribution leads to a better equilibrium for the 
planner. Since the planner’s information revelation is always truthful, agents’ beliefs 
* µ after the planner’s full information revelation assign probability1 to the revealed 
distribution, induced byσ . The best-responses to these beliefs generate profile
* σ . The 
key part in this definition is that the best-responses to the old distribution of play are also 
best-responses for the distribution which occurs after the information revelation takes 
place, that is,  i i
* ,σ ∀ a best response to i −
* σ . Hence, the change in the state of the 
dynamic system following an information announcement is sustainable. 
Condition ) (e ensures that at least one player has a strict incentive to change her behavior. 
Example1. We shall illustrate definition 1 showing how a self-confirming 
equilibrium can be undone by information revelation that leads to a better outcome for 
the planner. Consider the social interaction between investors and officials presented in 
the introduction (Figure 1 . 1 , page3). We will analyze more strictly the arguments here. 
Note that the game is similar to a trust game, but here the subgame perfect equilibrium 
outcome  ) , ( C E  is good for society. If player1’s believe that player2’s will cooperate, 
their best-response is to enter, whereas if they think player2’s will not cooperate, they 
should refrain from entering. We assume that there is a benevolent government, the 
objective of which is to maximize social welfare, which depends on the terminal nodes of 
the game, and the frequency at which each terminal node is reached. Accordingly, 14 
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= σ π σ  is the planner’s objective function, as a function of the 
“state”, the mixed strategy profileσ .  
Assume that the state of the economy is described by the specific profile of mixed 
strategiesσ , illustrated in Figure 1 . 1 , where one-fifth from the population of player1 ’s 
enter, believing that player 2’s cooperate with probability one, and four-fifths exit, 
believing that 2’s never cooperate. In fact, player2’s always cooperate. So, the initial 
self-confirming equilibrium is } ); 2 . 0 , 8 . 0 {( C E X = σ .
13 Assume that the planner 
announces the true aggregate distribution of actions in all decision nodes. If player1’s 
simply best-respond to their beliefs about player2’s play, and they regard the 
information revelation as truthful, then they all enter after the announcement since they 
expect that2’s will cooperate. 
The new state of the game, profile } ; {
* C E = σ , is very compelling as a steady 
state, despite the fact that the players best-respond to the correct beliefs about the 
previous period, which assign probability one to that period’s distribution of play. The 
reason is that
* σ  is a Nash Equilibrium, so players also best-respond to the current 
distribution of play as well. The planner prefers 
* σ to the old profile because more 
profitable transactions take place and thus has the incentive to fully reveal the aggregate 
information. Hence, σ is full-revelation unstable.  
 
                                                 
13 Note that this is just one of infinitely many self-confirming equilibria in this game. Any mixed strategy 
of population “one”coupled with fraction 1 of population “two” playing C  is a self-confirming 
equilibrium. We chose this specific fraction for illustrative reasons.    15 
 
1.3.2 Partial Information Revelation  
Here we assume that not all information sets need to be reached, so it is possible 
that H H ≠ ) (σ . Moreover, we assume that the planner may announce only partial 
information. Of course, the planner may only reveal information about behavior at 
information sets reached with positive probability underσ , otherwise there is nothing to 
announce. Consequently, the planner may reveal the distribution of play at a subset of the 
family of all information sets reached with positive probability underσ . Hence, if we 
denote by 
A H any set of information sets, for which the planner reveals the distribution 




A                      ) 1 (  
For simplicity, we also require that the planner may only reveal information for 






A H H                    ) 2 (  
Definition: A set  ) (σ
A H which satisfies  ) 1 (  and  ) 2 (  given a profileσ , is called 
an “information revelation set onσ ”. 
For concreteness, denote by  A H J the subset of Ιassociated with the specific 
information revelation set
A H . We want to restrict ourselves to self-confirming equilibria 
with independent beliefs.  A self-confirming equilibriumσ has independent beliefs if for 
all players iand all  ∈ i s support ), ( i σ the associated beliefs  i µ  16 
 
satisfy = Π ×
−
≠ } ( j




Π ×µ  for all measurable  j j Π ⊆ Π
−
 (Fudenberg-Levine a 1993 ).
14  
Now, fix a SCE σ supported by beliefsµ . Since the information revelation of the planner 
is truthful, following the announcement of the planner, the beliefs of all players must be 
consistent with the distributions he announces.  
Definition: We say that an information revelation set
A H on a SCE profileσ , 
supported by beliefsµ , generates “transition beliefs”
* µ if for alliand for all  ∈ i s
* support 
( i
* σ ) the beliefs 
*
i s µ  satisfy: 
1 )} / ( ) ( : {
^
* = = Π ∈ − − j j j j j i i s h h
i σ π π π µ  for all
A
j H h ∈ , and  } { } {
*
j s j s i i
− −
Π = Π µ µ  for all 
A H J j∉ and for all measurable  j j Π ⊆ Π
−
. 
Since agents do not know the payoff functions of others, they do not understand 
the strategic behavior of the planner, nor do they evaluate changes in others’ behavior 
following the announcement. They simply believe the information announcement and 
adjust their play accordingly, believing everything else is the same. This idea is captured 




                                                 
14 Kuhn has shown that these beliefs are equivalent with point-valued beliefs at a unique strategy profile of 
opponents i
i
− π . 17 
 
Definition: Let σ be a SCE supported by beliefsµ . For a fixed information 
revelation set 
A H onσ , we say that 
* σ is a profile supported by
A H  if: 
For all iand for all  ∈ i s
* support( i
* σ ), i s
* maximizes  ) (.,
*
i s i u µ where the beliefs 
*
i s µ  are 
the transition beliefs generated by 
A H .                                   (3) 
In other words, an information revelation set supports a profile
* σ if the transition 
beliefs it generates support
* σ . Note that a given 
* σ may be supported by multiple 
transition beliefs, but a specific information revelation set
A H generates unique transition 
beliefs.  
Definition2: A self-confirming equilibriumσ , supported by beliefsµ , is partial-
revelation-unstable relative to the planer’s preferences, if there exists an information 
revelation set
A H onσ , and a mixed profile
* σ such that the following hold: 
a) 
* σ is a profile supported by
A H . 
b) 
* . σ is a self-confirming equilibrium, which for alliand for all  ∈ i s
* support( i
* σ ), is 
supported by beliefs 
*
i s µ for all ) , (
* *
i i i j s H H h −
−
− − ∈ σ . 
c)   ) ( ) (
* σ σ
PL PL U U > . 
d) ) , ( ) , (
* * *
i i s i s i s u s u µ µ > , for some i, for some  ∈ i s support( i σ ), and for some 
∈ i s
* support( i
* σ ). 
This means that if all agents simply update their beliefs assigning probability 1to 
the planner’s announcements, and they keep their old beliefs in the nodes about which 
there is no revelation, then their best responses to the new beliefs form a self-confirming 18 
 
equilibrium profile. Again, this self-confirming equilibrium is compelling as the new 
steady state of the system, because if this profile is played, agents update information 
only in the information sets in  ) , (
* *
i i s H −
−
σ , hence they want to continue their chosen 
actions since this profile is a self-confirming equilibrium. In information sets 
outside ) , (
* *
i i s H −
−
σ , agents maintain their old beliefs, and they do not have reason to 
update them in the absence of active learning.  
Example 2. We shall show that with partial information revelation, the planner 
can achieve more than what he can achieve with full information revelation, even 
when H H =
−
) (σ . Assume that the planner’s preferences are as in example1. Consider the 
self-confirming equilibrium presented in Figure 2 . 1 , which is the profile 
} 4 ); 3 8 ,. 3 2 (. ); 2 5 ,. 2 5 (. ); 1 5 ,. 1 5 {(. P T P T P T P = σ . 
  The pure strategies for players are “pass” (the horizontal move) or “take” (the 
vertical move). Half of player 1’s and half of player 2’s do not pass, although it would 
clearly be optimal for them to do so given behavior of player 3’s . The beliefs supporting 
this self-confirming equilibrium are as follows. Player 3’s who “take” believe that player 
4’s “take” with probability 
2
1
> α  and player 2’s who take believe that player 3’s 




 and player threes pass with probability1. Of course, all players have 
correct beliefs about all the other nodes. 19 
 
The best outcome for society is(4,4,0,1). There are many possible 
announcements that may increase the frequency of this outcome. If the planner 
announces the aggregate play of player threes, she can induce player1’s and2’s to enter. 
However, if she were to announce also the play of player4’s, all player3’s would pass, 
and the outcome would be (0,0,2,1) which is clearly worse for the planner.
15 In this 
example, full information revelation would not work, because some players have a 
“superstition” (wrong beliefs) that is beneficial for society and should be maintained. 







                                                 
15 Notice that if player 1’s realized that aggregate play is common knowledge, and in addition could think 
strategically given the others’ payoffs, they would not pass. However, here we assume that players do not 
know the payoffs of their opponents. 
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The Beneficial Superstition Game 20 
 
Assume that the planner announces aggregate behavior at node3. Players’ best 
responses to the new beliefs leads to } 4 ), 3 8 ,. 3 2 (. , 2 , 1 {
* P T P P P = σ . Note that this profile 
describes the best response of all players, with each player having his old beliefs for all 
nodes except node 3 (this follows from the independence of beliefs). For example, half 
of the player1’s who pass believe that player 2’s take with probability 
4
3
and the other 
half believe that player 2’s take with probability
2
1
. However, this profile is also a self-
confirming equilibrium: player 1’s who pass best-respond to the actual distribution of 
play
* σ as well. Player 3’s believe that 1’s and 2’s pass with probability
2
1
 , but still 
their action is optimal given the true distribution of play in nodes 1 and 2 and their 
beliefs about node4. Therefore, when these players update their beliefs as they observe 
moves on the equilibrium path, this only reinforces their choices given their (fixed) 
beliefs for the nodes they never reach. 
Clearly, ) ( ) (
* σ σ
PL PL U U > , since a greater mass of the population achieves 
) 1 , 0 , 4 , 4 ( under 
* σ , and this result cannot be achieved with full information revelation. 
Note that this showed the existence of a subset players, whose information sets 
are reached with positive probability under σ , and the behavior of which, if revealed, 
leads to a better self-conforming equilibrium for the planner. There are other 





1.3.3 Strict Revelation Instability 
In the following example, we once more assume that the planner maximizes 
social welfare. Consider Figure 3 . 1 . The equilibrium described by the numbers in 
brackets is full revelation unstable. The problem is that after information about the 
behavior of player2’s is revealed, player1’s are indifferent between action B andC .  
 
In particular, player1’s that choose Abelieve that a fraction 
2
1
1 > p  of player2’s 
choose u and a fraction 
2
1
2 > p  of player2’s choose U (given that the respective nodes 
are reached, of course). If the planner were to reveal the fact that, in both their nodes, 
player 2’s choose the action that gives high payoffs to player1’s, then player 1’s would  
not play  A. But given the fact that they are now indifferent between choiceB and 
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words, their transition beliefs support multiple profiles. For information revelation to lead 
to a better social outcome, it is necessary that player1’s choose actionB , not actionC . 
There is no obvious reason why these agents would choose this. Hence, the planner 
cannot guarantee that he will achieve higher payoffs with information revelation.  Hence, 
the notion of revelation instability of this equilibrium is not as compelling as in our 
previous examples. Therefore, we define the following concept: 
Definition3 : A self-confirming equilibriumσ , supported by beliefsµ , is strictly 
partial-revelation-unstable relative to the planer’s preferences, if there exists an 
information revelation set
A H onσ , such that for all profiles 
* σ supported by
A H , the 
following hold: 
a) 
* . σ is a self-confirming equilibrium, which for alliand for all  ∈ i s
* support( i
* σ ), is 
supported by the transition beliefs
*
i s µ , generated by 
A H , for all ) , (
* *
i i i j s H H h −
−
− − ∈ σ .  
b) ) ( ) (
* σ σ
PL PL U U > . 
c) ) , ( ) , (
* * *
i i s i s i s u s u µ µ > , for some i, for some  ∈ i s support( i σ ), and for some 
∈ i s
* support( i
* σ ). 
Information revelation can unambiguously lead to a better SCE for the planner in 
this case, regardless of the tie-breaking rule, because all possible new profiles are self-
confirming equilibria and they are preferable for the planner. Note that if there are no 
indifferent agents given transition beliefs
* µ , a unique 
* σ is supported by
A H , and 




1.4 Defending the Assumptions of the Basic Model  
There are important implicit assumptions behind our basic model that should be 
defended. First of all, it seems that our agents are “naïve” in the sense that they do not 
understand that other populations will change their behavior after the announcements. We 
have already underscored the fact that more “sophisticated” agents who do not know the 
payoffs of other agents (including the planner) will behave in this manner as well. 
Secondly, it has been pointed out in seminars that it seems easier for the planner to 
directly reveal agents’ utility, rather than their actions. We believe that this impression is 
simply wrong. Many of our important examples involve uncertainty about the moral 
incentives of agents, which are not directly observable. The notion of the planner 
revealing the utility function of officials in Example 1 seems nonsensical, but he may 
reveal their behavior.  
Moreover, the informational requirements for the planner appear too strong. How 
does the planner know the moral payoffs in Example1? Our answer to this question is 
based on revealed preference. If the planner can see in the aggregate data that all officials 
cooperate, he can infer their preferences. A seemingly stronger assumption is that the 
planner knows agents’ beliefs. We argue that much can be inferred from the aggregate 
data about beliefs as well. In Example2, there is a specific range of beliefs about 
opponents’ actions that rationalizes the choices of player1’s and2’s who choose “take”. 
To sum up, although some of our assumptions seem excessively strong, they are many 
important cases where they need not be so.  24 
 
1.5 Revelation-Stable Equilibria and Socially Valuable Information 
 Definition: A self-confirming equilibrium is called “revelation-stable” if it is 
neither full revelation-unstable nor partial revelation-unstable. 
A unitary self-confirming equilibrium is a mixed strategy profile σ such that for 
all i there exists beliefs  i µ such that for all  ∈ i s support ) ( i σ , it holds that:  
a)  i s maximizes ) , ( i i u µ ⋅ . 
b)  1 )] / ( ) ( : [
^
= = Π ∈ − − j j j j j i i i h h σ π π π µ for all  i j ≠  and ) , ( i i j s H h −
−
∈ σ . 
In other words, for such a self-confirming equilibrium, the same beliefs are used 
to rationalize all pure strategies of a given mixed strategy.  
Proposition 1: All unitary self-confirming equilibria are revelation-stable. 
Proof/ Let σ be a unitary self-confirming equilibrium supported by beliefsµ . If 
) (σ
−
∈H hj , then  ) , ( i i j s H h −
−
∈ σ  for some  ∈ i s support ) ( i σ , for all j i ≠ . Hence, the 
initial beliefs  i µ must be correct for all  ) (σ
−
∈H hj , and for all  . j i ≠  It follows that for 
any information revelation set
A H , the transition beliefs
* µ generated by 
A H  are the same 
as the initial beliefsµ . Clearly, then, there is no  σ σ ≠
*  such that condition (e) of 
definitions 2 , 1  holds. QED 
Theorem1is important for economic policy because it provides a justification for 
“selective affirmative action”. By this term we mean the provision of incentives to special 
members of unrepresented social groups to try novel actions. These will “test” the ability 
of these agents to perform well in activities that they are expected to fail. The proposition 25 
 
shows that prejudice that totally prevents certain social groups from interacting with other 
groups is the most difficult to overcome. Persuading these members to experiment 
against their priors could generate socially desirable information, which, combined with 
selective information release, facilitates reaching a better social equilibrium. In Example 
1, if people never invested, information revelation would not work. This result is similar 
with that of Jackson and Kalai ) 1997 ( who, in a setting where agents always observe 
aggregate information, argue that socially valuable information cannot be generated if 
people’s priors are such that they never try a certain action. Hence, incentives should be 
given for experimentation against one’s priors.  
We will show by example that information revelation itself can lead to socially 
valuable information, causing the use of novel strategies. A strategy that was not used in 
the old equilibriumσ may be used after information revelation takes place. This provides 
a benefit to society additional to the higher payoffs associated with the new equilibrium.  
Example3.  Consider the game illustrated in Figure 4 . 1 , and the SCE 
} ' ' ; ' ); 5 . 0 , 5 . 0 {( L R R L = σ . The beliefs are as follows: player1’s who playM believe that 
player4’s play  ''' L  with probability
2
1
. Player 1’s who playR  believe that player 2’s 
play  ' L  with probability 
6
5
, player 3’s play  ' ' R with probability 
2
1
≥ α , and player4 ’s 
play ' ' ' L  with probability 
2
1
≥ γ .  Lis not played at all in this equilibrium. However, if 
the planner announced the behavior of player 2’s, then all player 1’s who play R would 26 
 
switch to strategyL . In addition to the higher payoffs immediately achieved, this change 
would give information about the behavior of player 4’s.  
 
Let Θ be the set of all extensive-form games that have a terminal node ψ with the 
following property: for every  ψ , Ι ∈ i  is the unique ) ( max arg z ui
Z z∈
. Let G be the set of all 
extensive-form games that have a terminal node ψ with the following property:ψ is the 









, where  y is the immediate 
predecessor of ψ . Note that G ⊂ Θ . 
Definition: A game Γis game of “monoambiguous choices”, if for all players i 
and for all i i H h ∈ , there is at most one  ) ( ' i h A ∈ α such that some ) (
1 α
− ∈l x  is a decision 
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“The Dead Strategy Rise up Again” Game 27 
 
terminal node immediately follows all actions, except (possibly) one.  An example of such 
a game is the “beneficial superstition” game, where each player had at most one action that 
was followed by some decision node. Note that if Γis a game of monoambiguous choices, 
all players have perfect information of other’s moves.  
Theorem. Let Γbe a game of complete information such that G ∈ Γ and Γis also a 
game of “monoambiguous choices”.  Let  σ be a strict self-confirming equilibrium of 
Γsuch that ) (σ ψ
−
∈Z . If, givenσ , ψ  is not reached with probability one, then σ  is full 
revelation unstable.  
Proof/ Clearly, all information sets in the game are singletons.  Let
∠
α  be the path of 
actions that leads toψ , which is indexed by the precedence relation of the tree.  Let  ) (t ι  be 
the player that moves at the  − t th step of the path, T be the total number of steps, and 
) (t
∠
α denote the action at the  − t th step of the path. Let also
t
t h ) ( ι be the information set of 
player  ) (t ι where action ) (t
∠




T T α σ π ι ι   by the 




i H .  If this set in nonempty, then the pure strategy ] [
∠
α i s  that prescribes the choice of 
actions in 
∠




i i H h is optimal given beliefs that assign probability1 to the true 
distribution of actions induced byσ . The reason for this is that since ψ is reached with 
positive probability givenσ , there are some player i’s that choose pure strategy ] [
∠
α i s . 
These players know the trueσ , since because of the form of the game, the information sets 28 
 
on the path to ψ are the only ones reached with positive probability underσ .  By 
“monoambiguous actions”, it follows that they also know the exact payoffs they would get 
following any other strategy. Hence, for all players ithat have a decision in the path toψ , 
] [
∠
α i s   is the optimal strategy when they knowσ .  Hence,  following full information 
revelation, the welfare-maximizing node ψ  is reached with probability one.  Clearly this 
outcome is preferable to the planner than any other. QED 
 
1.6 Self-Censorship: When is Concealing Information a Good Idea? 
It is worth considering conditions under which the planner may not want to reveal 
all available information given a SCEσ . This issue is very important for economic policy 
because of the increasing influence of the media. As far as we know, economic theory 
has not explicitly addressed the issue of self-censorship.
16 We define “self-censorship” as 
the practice of not revealing available information regarding the aggregate data.  In this 
section, we restrict ourselves once more to the case where the planner is a benevolent 
government and we argue that if, in certain cases, full aggregate information leads to 
negative social outcomes, then “self-censoring” makes sense. In the following paragraphs 
we shall try to characterize cases where “self-censorship” improves social welfare. 
The beneficial superstition game is an example of the first type of games where 
full revelation of the existing information may be socially detrimental. In games like this, 
                                                 
16 The main arguments in the social debate regarding the importance of self-censoring are philosophical. 
Indisputably, there are major philosophical questions here that are related to ethical values such as freedom.  
However, we argue that game theory can contribute to this debate as well, regardless of the great 
importance of the philosophical issues involved. 29 
 
there is a social group whose welfare is maximized at a bad social outcome, and the 
interests of different social groups are conflicting. Roughly speaking, this special social 
group corresponds to “criminals” who appropriate the material payoffs of others. 
Example 2 reveals that “criminals” should not be fully informed. This agrees with 
common sense, which dictates that it is not a good idea to reveal information that shows 
that crime pays. Since the logic behind the need to conceal information is obvious in this 
case, we shall focus more on cases where the interests of social groups are aligned.  
Example  4. The following example shows that even if a strictly Pareto superior 
outcome exists, and it is reached with positive probability, full information revelation 
may still not be optimal. Figure  5 . 1  illustrates a game with a Pareto dominant outcome, 
where all players earn5. As usual, the numbers in the brackets show the fractions of each 
population following each strategy in the equilibriumσ . Note that the payoff-dominant 
terminal node is reached with positive probability. Player1’s that choose Lbelieve 
player3’s play  ' l with probability 9 . 0 1 > p , player1’s that chooseR believe player2’s 
play ' L  with probability 9 . 0 2 > p , and player2’s that choose  ' L  believe player4’s play 
' ' R  with probability 9 . 0 3 > p . 
Now, full information revelation will make the outcome  ) 3 , 3 , 3 , 3 , 3 ( be reached 
with probability equal to one. The reason for this is that, given the behavior of player2’s, 
player1’s had better chooseR . However, if the planner only announced the behavior of 
player4’s, then the payoff dominant outcome would be achieved  % 90 of the times, 
which is clearly better for society. In the following session, we shall try to generally 




1.7 Partial-Revelation Improvable Self-Confirming Equilibria 
  For the following definitions, let σ be an information unstable self-confirming 
equilibrium supported by beliefsµ . 
Definition: A (self-confirming equilibrium) profile σ σ ≠
* , which satisfies the 
conditions of definition2, is called an “information dominant” (self-confirming 
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Definition: The set U
A A
f H H = is called the “full revelation set” of σ . 
Let  σ Κ be the set of all information dominant self-confirming equilibria over the 




PL PL U U
Κ ∈
≡ . 
Definition: A self-confirming equilibriumσ is called “partial revelation 
improvable” if  ) (
' '
max σ U U
PL > for all
' ' σ supported by
A
f H . 
In other words, a given SCE is “partial revelation improvable” if the optimal 
information revelation, givenσ andµ , entails concealing some aggregate information.  
Definition: Let σ be a SCE supported by beliefsµ . We call the beliefs generated 
by
A
f H   “full-revelation transition beliefs”.  
Note that these beliefs need not assign probability one to the true behavior of 
opponents, givenσ , for all information sets reached with positive probability underσ , 
because of the requirement of condition ) 2 ( . 
Now we shall examine whether partial information also makes sense in the setting 
where incentives of various social groups are more or less aligned. Can we identify 
classes of games where concealing information cannot be of use? As we shall see, it is 
truly the case.  
Proposition 2. Let  Γbe a game of complete information such that G ∈ Γ and  Γis 
also a game of “monoambiguous choices”.  Let  σ be a self-confirming equilibrium of 
Γsuch that  ) (σ ψ
−
∈Z  andψ  is not reached with probability one givenσ . Then, σ  is not 
partial revelation improvable. 32 
 
Proof/ This follows directly from the theorem. 
Corollary:  Let  Γbe a game of perfect information and Γis also a game of 
“monoambiguous actions”. Let there be a terminal node ψ  such thatψ is the strictly Pareto 
superior outcome. Letσ be a self-confirming equilibrium of Γsuch that nodeψ belongs 
to ) (σ
−
Z . Then, σ is not partial revelation improvable. 
Proposition 3.  Let  Θ ∈ Γ be a game of complete information. Let  σ be a self-
confirming equilibrium of Γsuch that ∈ ψ ) (σ
−
Z .  Then, if σ   is partial revelation 
improvable the following holds: For some player iwho has a choice in the path 
toψ , ∈ ∃ i s support ) ( i σ such that ) , ) ( ( ) , (
' '
i i i i i i s u s u µ α µ
∠
>                 ) 4 ( 
Proof/ If  ) 4 (  was not true, then the best-response of each player to full information 
revelation would be to follow strategies
∠
) (α i s , hence ψ  would be reached with probability 
one. Clearly, there is no partial information revelation scheme that can achieve a better 
outcome. QED 
However, the inverse is not true. That is, in SCE there may be strategies for which  ) 4 (  
holds, and still partial revelation cannot achieve better social outcomes than full 
information revelation. The two propositions restrict the scope of usefulness of self-
censorship in game with a unique Pareto optimal outcome. Proposition2shows that self-
censorship does not improve social welfare in a setting of monoambiguous actions, and 
proposition 3 identifies a necessary condition for self-censorship to be optimal. It is safe to 33 
 
argue based on our results that self-censorship is useful in a very wide range of games and 
not only in a small category.  
 
1.8 Applications 
Before we mention some specific examples where selective information 
revelation is used, it is worth emphasizing two points. First, there is a lack of explicit 
written discussion about policies that use selective information revelation to direct the 
behavior of the public. The reasons for this are easy to see: first of all, the information 
revealer does not wish to be criticized for manipulation of the public’s behavior and self-
censorship. Secondly, manipulation of expectations is more effective when it is covert. If 
the public knew about these policies, they would learn to understand when some 
information is missing, which would partly cancel the effects of selective information 
revelation. Because of these issues, the descriptive validity of our approach becomes 
more difficult to substantiate. It is also important to note that there are other important 
theoretical reasons to expect that aggregate information revelation can direct the behavior 
of the population, such as preferences for conformity.
17  
Governments follow implicit strategies of selective information revelation in 
some occasions. Authorities typically do not provide accurate data about those who 
                                                 
17 A large literature in psychology explains where this type of preferences stems form. Theories of 
cognitive dissonance argue that a person’s actions should agree with her perceived social role, otherwise 
they experience dissonance. Accordingly, prior to aggregate information revelation a person may tend to 
exaggerate the degree in which other people act the in the same way she does (this type of distortion of 
one’s prior expectations has been substantiated and is called “false consensus”). Hence, if a person receives 
information that shows that her actions contradict the way she understands her social role, she may change 
her action in a way that resembles conformity. She may however simply discard the aggregate information 
if her preference for the given action is very strong.  34 
 
escape capture. Consider the “beneficial superstition game” of Figure  2 . 1 . 1’s and2’s are 
two populations of investors who get a high benefit if they cooperate( 1, 2) PP . The group 
of player 3’s are potential thieves who can grab part of the surplus ( 3) P  or not( 3) T . 
Players4’s are police officers who may catch the criminal ( 4) T or not( 4) P . As we have 
seen, the planner should not reveal the distribution of actions of the police officers here. 
This is an example where society is better off when certain agents, whose “optimal 
behavior” entails significant externalities for others, are ignorant of the true distribution 
of actions.   
Furthermore, governments’ policies to mitigate social discrimination may involve 
selective information revelation when agreements with the media are reached. The media 
agree to refrain from emphasizing certain types of information for the good of the public. 
Revealing information that contradicts social stereotypes and concealing aggregate 
information that reproduces the stereotypes is a sensible and common strategy. A typical 
example of this is the extensive media coverage of the cases where women are 
performing jobs that are considered “men’s jobs”. In our interpretation, this may be done 
in order to change expectations about women’s strategies in the population, and hence 
change others’ optimal behavior when playing against  a woman.
18 In some sense, 




                                                 
18 Preference for conformity of behavior within a social group also plays a major role here.  
19 See Hargreaves –Heap and Varoufakis (2002) for strong experimental evidence for this. 35 
 
There are also significant applications related to discrimination, investor 
sentiments and elections. The media typically often deliberately try not to emphasize the 
behavior of people in the underclass, in order to avoid creating and rewarding antisocial 
behavior. Since many forms of antisocial behavior depend on the non-pecuniary social 
rewards that people receive from their peer groups and friends, information about the 
extent of such social phenomena should be handled carefully.
20 Moreover, policies 
aiming to protect investor sentiments often selectively conceal information. In most 
western countries after the Great Depression, novel institutions and policies were enacted 
to prevent pessimistic business sentiments from spreading. The notion that the stock 
market authorities may selectively reveal aggregate data in order to check investors’ 
panic and promote optimism is acceptable. Furthermore, in some countries, the State 
restrains the use of public opinion polls during election periods. There is much evidence 
that voters like to vote for the wining party.
21 A specific political party, and special 
interest groups that support this party, may want to selectively reveal polls that show that 
the party is winning and conceal the ones that show that it is losing. Hence, in many 
countries there are restrictions on polls during the campaign period. 
22 
                                                 
20 For example, according to a Dutch journalist, there is an implicit agreement in the Dutch press to refrain 
from overemphasizing the occurrences of sports violence and hooliganism, in order not to encourage 
potential new hooligans. 
21 This has been supported by many studies, and it is called “the bandwagon effect”. Preference for 
conformity seems to be a major reason for this phenomenon.  
22 See Michalos, p. 410 and Morwitz and Pluzinski  ) 1996 ( , p. 53. The countries that have implemented 
or consider implementing a ban on political polling during election periods include Brazil, France, Canada 
and Germany.  36 
 
The previous example made it clear that benevolent social planners may not the 
only ones who use selective information revelation to achieve their specific objectives.
23 
Marketing behaviors are replete with similar manipulations of aggregate information. 
Advertising is a major example where information revelation is selective: the publisher of 
a book will promptly announce that the book has sold a million copies, but this not likely 
to be the case when it has only sold thirty-five copies.   
  At the same time, our analysis may be used to evaluate the consequences of 
various constraints that the ethical system of a society imposes on its government and 
special interests, shedding a different light on the social effects of restrictions and 
freedoms on public information revelation. For example, what are the results of the 
unlimited ability of the opposition parties in democracies to reveal data about corruption, 
undermining the public belief in the honesty of public officials? Shouldn’t this effect be 
considered in the public debate? 
24 We hypothesize that some sort of constraint of this 
ability may be beneficial for the economy.  
 
1.9 Conclusions 
  We used an evolutionary framework with anonymous interactions to capture the 
capacity of aggregate information revelation to manipulate the behavior of the public. We 
showed that the “planner”, who knows the aggregate information, can move the economy 
to his preferred equilibria by selectively revealing this information. However, social 
                                                 
23 In fact, the “planner” need not even be unique. The two opposing parties may both reveal poll 
information, each to maximize its probabilities of winning. 
24 Thus, our approach contributes to the literature that examines the possibility that transparency may have 
some negative effects.  37 
 
payoffs could be improved relative to a given self-confirming equilibrium, only if this 
equilibrium is heterogeneous. Further, concealing information can be optimal in certain 
cases.  Finally, we presented a wide range of social phenomena which fits well with our 
approach.  
  The model could be extended in several different directions. Firstly, experimental 
evidence indicates that “social preferences” play a major role when aggregate 
information is revealed. Incorporating such preferences, especially “conformity 
preferences”, in the model would be difficult but worthwhile. Secondly, using an 
explicitly dynamic approach would be fruitful, because it would allow us to examine the 
potential for many information revelations, rather than a single one. Moreover, in such an 
environment with multiple information revelations, it would be equally rewarding to 













Chapter 2. Aggregate Information Revelation, Nash Equilibrium and 
Social Welfare: an Experimental Investigation 
 
2.1 Introduction  
  Examining and deeply understanding the effects of aggregate information release 
in a society is very important for many different reasons. First of all, there is the 
fundamental question of whether aggregate information is beneficial for society. Will 
trust in the society promoted when people see others’ behavior? Will people tend to 
become more or less morally responsible if they observe the aggregate data? Second, 
aggregate information release is usually considered exogenous, but we believe that the 
question of why aggregate information is revealed is of major economic interest. 
Possessors of aggregate information are typically special interests and governments who 
want to satisfy their own goals.
25 Moreover, older studies put forward important issues 
from a game-theoretical viewpoint. Fudenberg and Levine (FL)  ) 1997 ( argue that agents’ 
“passive learning” and wrong beliefs in equilibrium can explain behavior in many 
experiments of extensive-form games where no aggregate information is provided. 
Finally, Harrison and McCabe (HM)  ) 1996 (
26 assert that aggregate information causes 
                                                 
25 For example, the seller of a product would like to know the optimal scheme of selectively revealing 
information about how his product sells, in order to maximize his profits. In a similar vein, the auctioneer is 
interested about what information about bids to reveal. Political parties also care whether opinion poll 
results affect voting behavior. All these special groups have an incentive to selectively reveal aggregate 
information to manipulate the behavior of the public in their desired way. 
26 They used information revelation of aggregate data to manipulate subjects’ expectations in the ultimatum 
game. They find that information revelation leads to convergence to the subgame perfect equilibrium 
outcome, because it allows for consistency of expectations. 39 
 
convergence to Nash equilibrium,
27 serving as a surrogate to the assumption of common 
knowledge of rationality. We examined all these issues by comparing the results of 
treatments with and without aggregate information. We found that aggregate information 
changes agents’ behavior significantly, and its effects on aggregate welfare and 
convergence to Nash equilibrium can vary dramatically when there are small changes in 
the environment.  
  The experimental economics literature has seldom addressed the issue of 
aggregate information as its primary focus.
28 Most studies with aggregate information 
release have not confirmed the generality of the claim of HM regarding convergence to 
Nash Equilibrium. Moreover, some studies find that aggregate information increases total 
payoffs, while some other studies find the opposite. Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe(1995) 
performed experiments of one-round trust games
29 and found some support for the notion 
that information revelation of aggregate data increases aggregate payoffs and decreases 
the accuracy of the Nash equilibrium prediction. Dufwenberg and Gneezy(2002) 
reported the results of experimental auctions that resemble Bertrand price competition
30 
and they found that full information revelation of the entire vector of bids tends to 
decrease the auctioneer’s revenue, leading average bids away from the Nash equilibrium 
                                                 
27 In our paper, when we refer to “Nash equilibrium” we mean Nash equilibrium with selfish preferences. 
28 Results from social psychology indicate that the information that a player receives about how other 
people behave matters for player’s own behavior. There is a vast literature in social psychology regarding 
social influence, conformity, social norms and cognitive dissonance. For example, see Cialdini and 
Goldstein (2004) and Marks and Miller ) 1987 ( . 
29 Each “sender” had 10$ that he could send to the receiver. The amount sent tripled, and then the receiver 
decided how much money to send back. 
30  Each subject was coupled with another person and chose an integer bid between 2 and 100. The subject 
that submitted the lowest bid won the auction and received a fixed monetary amount multiplied by the 
winning bid. The subject with the losing bid won zero, and if there was a tie the winner’s amount was split. 
The fact that subjects were randomly matched is good for our comparisons.  40 
 
outcome. Hargreaves–Heap and Varoufakis (2002) used a hawk-dove (symmetric) 
game, where subjects were split into two groups randomly, and they showed that 
revealing the aggregate distribution of actions of the two groups had a great impact on the 
evolution of play and on the distribution of payoffs. Finally, Frey and Meier (2004 ) 
found that revealing information about the fraction of the population that performs a 
certain charitable action tends to increase the frequency of this action in the population, 
improving social payoffs and moving aggregate play away from Nash equilibrium.
31  
  The purpose of this paper is to provide further evidence for the effects of 
aggregate information, with a special emphasis on testing the ideas of FL and HM. We 
experimentally investigate the effects of aggregate information on the long-run aggregate 
distribution of actions in the centipede game, which is a two-person trust game where 
each player has two moves. In each move, a player chooses to “pass” or “take” and if he 
takes the game ends, while if he passes the total payoffs double and the other player takes 
the turn in choosing an action. The unique Nash and self-confirming equilibrium 
outcome, (which is, of course, the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome), is 
where the first mover drops immediately. This outcome, which yields minimal social 
payoffs, has found very limited empirical support in previous studies.  
To test how information revelation affects the evolution of play, we perform a 
series of experimental sessions of the four-move centipede game. Following our game-
theoretical motivation presented in Chapter 1, we want to approximate a dynamic game 
of large populations with anonymous matching. Our experiments are designed 
                                                 
31 However, it should be noted that this result obtained only when they revealed “optimistic” information 
about others’ behavior, in the sense that the revealed fraction was relatively large.  41 
 
accordingly, with each subject interacting with each opponent exactly once.
32 We 
examine several different forms of information feedback and two different payoff 
structures. In addition to the control treatment, we have “Information Treatments” where 
subjects can see the aggregate fractions of “pass” or “take” in every decision node in the 
immediately previous round. Information can be full or partial, with the latter implying 
that each subject of a particular group observes the fractions of the other group only.
33 
Moreover, we examine the effects of information when we modify the payoffs slightly 
and far off the equilibrium path. In particular, in the “modified payoff” treatments, the 
monetary cost to player2of passing in the last decision node - and essentially offering to 
player 1 a large monetary amount - is slightly lower. 
Our main result is that aggregate information revelation has large and significant 
effects on behavior and social payoffs, but the direction of these effects depends on the 
details of the game. With the initial payoff functions, “information” sessions typically 
converged to Nash equilibrium and total payoffs decreased significantly, contrary to the 
predictions of FL. Subjects’ failure to coordinate when information is provided is even 
more surprising given the fact that information adds a dynamic aspect where “signaling” 
is possible. However, with the modified payoff function, information had a positive effect 
on total payoffs. Therefore, if we proposed a policy for maximizing aggregate payoffs, 
we would argue that it is selective information release, not merely aggregate information 
                                                 
32 It is not possible to rule out repeated game effects totally, however, because players may realize they can 
affect the aggregate information that will be revealed in the future. This issue will be further discussed in 
part8. 
33 Each group corresponds to a player-role in the game. This means that, with partial information, all 
subjects who have the role of player 1only observe the fractions of behavior of subjects who are player 2’s 
and vice versa. 42 
 
or its absence, which has the optimal effect. In particular, our suggestions would be in the 
spirit of revealing “optimistic” information only. Our experiments help answer other 
important questions as well. We find that partial information revelation, where players 
observe play of the other population only, has similar effects with full information 
revelation. Moreover, when we replicate older treatments, our results are statistically 
different from those of the original experiments, and this might suggest a sample pool 
effect. We also show that aggregate information facilitates convergence to Nash 
equilibrium under some conditions and leads far from the equilibrium in some very 
similar ones; hence a general causal relationship between aggregate information and 
convergence to Nash equilibrium cannot be established. Finally, although we do not test a 
particular econometric model, we argue that theories of “conditional cooperation” 
account well for the results. “Selfish” preferences and “pure altruism” seem to be 
inconsistent with our findings.  
Part  2 . 2  introduces the centipede game with exponentially increasing payoffs and 
discusses the results of previous experimental studies of this game. Part  3 . 2  briefly 
introduces all 12 sessions of our experiment. Part 4 . 2  discusses the basic hypotheses and 
the results in the first set of treatments, NIR and FIR.
34 In part  5 . 2  we consider 
alternative theories that may explain the basic results and thus we motivate the 
introduction of treatment PIR. The results of this treatment are presented in part 6 . 2 . Part 
7 . 2 provides the theoretical motivation and the results of our last set of treatments, NIR-
                                                 
34 We shall describe extensively the details of these treatments when we introduce our experiments. 43 
 
M and FIR-M.  A detailed discussion of the results and their significance follows in 
part 8 . 2 . Part  9 . 2 concludes.  
 
2. 2 The Centipede Game: Introduction and Previous Experimental Studies 
In the two-player centipede game (Figure 1 . 2 ), two players share a monetary 
amount split into a large and a small pile, in a predetermined way for each terminal node. 
In each decision node, the player who moves can either “take” the large pile of money 
and the games ends, or pass” for next round. A player should always “take” now, if he 
expects that the other player will “take” in the subsequent move, but each player is better 
off passing now, if it is expected that the other player will also pass in the move after. In 
its finite version, the centipede game has an obvious candidate for a prediction of how it 
will be played: backward induction shows that in all Nash and self-confirming equilibria 







Experimental studies have found little support in favor of the Nash prediction, and 
it seems that subjects do not exclusively use backward induction and they do not assume 
full rationality of others when they try to predict others’ behavior. Most early 
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          Figure 2.1 The Two-Player Centipede Game with Geometrically Increasing Payoffs 
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experiments of the centipede game found very low frequencies of the predicted 
equilibrium outcome. (Note that here and in later parts we shall mainly refer to the last 
five rounds of experiments, where play is more likely to have converged to equilibrium). 
McKelvey and Palfrey (MP)(1992), in their classical experimental study of four-move 
and six-move centipede games, find that subjects “take” in the first decision node - which 
corresponds to the Nash equilibrium outcome - in no more than 8% of total matches. 
Fey, McKelvey and Palfrey (1996) find that, even in a setting of constant social payoffs, 
where the predictions of Nash, fairness and focal point theories agree in the same 
predicted outcome (where player 1 “takes” at move 1), players fail to achieve the 
equilibrium outcome 30 to 80 percent of the time, depending on the version of the game. 
Nagel and Tang(1998), using the equivalent normal form of the game, find relative 
frequencies of equilibrium play not exceeding5%.  
Other authors find more support for Nash equilibrium play by changing the basic 
features of the game, usually confounding more than one such change. Stein, Rappoport, 
Parco, and Nicholas(2003)  find that equilibrium play is chosen 30 to 40 percent of the 
time in an experiment where each “inning” of choices involved three players rather than 
two, stakes were much higher on average and the last terminal node gave zero payoffs to 
all players. Murphy, Rappoport and Parco(2006)use a continuous-time version of the 
centipede game, and they show that, with three players, games finish early in late rounds; 
hence there is evidence of strong convergence to equilibrium. With seven players, 
convergence is complete in all sessions.  
 45 
 
2.3 The Experiment 
Twelve experimental sessions were conducted at the California Social Science 
Experimental Laboratory (CASSEL) at UCLA. All subjects were UCLA students and the 
vast majority was undergraduate students. Each person was only allowed to participate in 
a single session. There were nine sessions with  30 = n (nis the number of participants), 
two sessions with 28 = n and one session with  26 = n . Each subject played 
2
n
 rounds of 
the four-move centipede game allowing for many repetitions and learning. Subjects also 
had the chance to gain experience with the game during three practice sessions. The 
relatively large number of participants somewhat mitigated the effects of repeated games 
and signaling that information revelation made possible. The matching scheme was the 
same as in MP(1992) . A rotating matching scheme was used, and the subject pool was 
divided into two groups of 
2
n
, the composition of which was fixed throughout the 
experiment.
35 Each participant was matched with each member of the other group exactly 
once. All information about the structure of the game and the matching details was made 
public knowledge to subjects, since the instructions were read in public. Subjects were 
paid the full amount that they accumulated in all real rounds and each monetary unit 
corresponded to one dollar. Subjects did not have particular difficulties understanding the 
game, and also had many opportunities to learn during the practice rounds and the 
repetitions of the game. Appendix 2 contains the instructions for treatment FIR. 
                                                 
35 For our subjects, the two groups were labeled the GREEN group and the YELLOW group. The members 
of the GREEN group always had the role of player 1 in the centipede game and the members of the 
YELLOW group always had the role of player 2.  46 
 
Table  1 . 2  shows the basic features of all12sessions. The game played in the first 
seven sessions was exactly the one described in Figure 1 . 2 . These sessions, therefore, had 
the same “relative payoffs” as in MP, but dollar payoffs were % 50  higher at every 
terminal node. In two of the sessions, the treatment was called “No Information 
Revelation” (NIR1 and NIR2). This was essentially the same treatment as in the four-
move centipede experiments of MP. In sessions FIR1 and FIR2 the treatment was called 
“Full Information Revelation” and subjects received information about how the members 
of both groups played in the previous round. In particular, during any round, all subjects 
saw the fractions of “pass” and “take”, in each of the decision nodes of the game, in the 
previous round.
36 For example, during the tenth round, in the first decision box, all 
subjects saw the fraction of the members of the GREEN group that chose “pass” or 
“take”, in this particular node, during the ninth round. In the second decision box, all 
subjects saw the fractions of the members of the YELLOW group that chose “pass” and 
“take”, in this node, in the ninth round. Similarly, subjects saw the respective information 
for all other nodes.
37 
In sessions PIR1, PIR2 and PIR3, the treatment was called “Partial Information 
Revelation”. The same kind of information as in treatment FIR was provided, but only for 
the “opposite” group. For example, all GREEN subjects in round5were shown the 
fractions of the YELLOW group of people that chose “pass” or “take”, in the fourth 
round, in all nodes where YELLOW moves. Subjects could not see the fractions in nodes 
                                                 
36 Remember that each node belongs to members of one group only.  
37 Of course, since not all nodes were reached in each match, subjects saw information only about those 
matches that reached in each particular node in the previous round.  47 
 
where their own group moves. We will call sessions with full or partial information 
release “information” sessions.  
In the last five sessions shown in Table  1 . 2  payoffs were slightly modified. In 
particular, subjects played the game shown in Figure 2 . 2 . Two of the sessions with 
modified payoffs, NIR1-M, NIR2-M did not involve information revelation. The other 
three sessions with modified payoffs were full information revelation sessions, with “full 
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Aggregate Information  Number of 
Matches 
Payoffs 
NIR1  30  NO  225  Similar with MP  
NIR2  28  NO  196  Similar with MP 
FIR1  30  FULL  225  Similar with MP 
FIR2  30  FULL  225  Similar with MP 
PIR1  30  OTHER GROUP ONLY  225  Similar with MP 
PIR2  28  OTHER GROUP ONLY  196  Similar with MP 
PIR3  30  OTHER GROUP ONLY  225  Similar with MP 
NIR1-M  30  NO  225  Modified 
NIR2-M  26  NO  169  Modified 
FIR1-M  30  FULL  225  Modified 
FIR2-M  30  FULL  225  Modified 
FIR3-M  30  FULL  225  Modified 
Table 2. 1 Characteristics of Each Experimental Session 
 
2.4 Treatments NIR and FIR: The Basic Hypothesis and Results 
Our principal hypothesis concerns comparison of play with and without aggregate 
information, and testing it was the major motivation for using the centipede game.  The 
results in MP show that enough “passing” ( % 18 ) exists in the last decision node to make 
it worthwhile for all agents to pass in early nodes. Fudenberg and Levine(1997) argue 
that that the results of MP can be explained as equilibrium behavior with respect to 49 
 
heterogeneous beliefs about the distribution of opponents’ actions. That is, for each 
population-group that plays a specific equilibrium strategy, beliefs need not be correct for 
nodes not reached for the specific group, given its strategy
38. Hence, if subjects knew the 
aggregate fractions in the experiments of MP, they would optimize by passing all the way 
until at least the last decision node. We wish to follow FL’s suggestion to compare 
treatments with full information revelation of aggregate play with treatments where 
people only observe play in their own matches.
39 We expect that with information about 
others’ behavior, the aggregate distributions of play will have a higher mass in late 
terminal nodes and subjects will, on average, make higher payoffs.
40  
 Hypothesis1: Full information revelation results in higher average payoffs for 
subjects.  We test for equality of average payoffs in treatments NIR and FIR, rounds 11-
15, and observe the direction of the possible difference.
41  
Appendix 1 contains descriptive data for all sessions.
42 Figures  6 . 2 3 . 2 − display 
the fraction of total matches that ended in each of the five terminal nodes in our two 
                                                 
38 The only part of the data that cannot be explained according to this theory (with selfish preferences) is 
some YELLOW subjects’ choice of “pass” in the last decision node. 
39 FL’s theory implies that selective information revelation of aggregate data matters, even in equilibrium. 
If people are “trapped” in a specific strategy and wrong beliefs, due to their strong priors and lack of 
experimentation, then, in the face of information revelation about the aggregate statistics, their expectations 
could change in a predictable way. This leaves the door open to manipulation of people’s behavior by those 
who possess the aggregate information. 
40 Note that because of the exponential form of the payoffs of the game, average payoffs are a good 
approximation of the degree to which subjects “trust” others and tend to “pass”.   
41 Note that a very important prerequisite for this argument to hold is that subjects’ behavior in the last 
decision node, when information is provided, will remain the same as in the original data of MP. In other 
words, we believe that there no important a priori reason to expect that information revelation will reduce 
YELLOW subjects’ incentives to pass in the last decision node and “give away money” to others. If 
anything, since subjects may realize that signaling is possible, we would expect information release to lead 
to more passing, not less.  
42 We use the notation of Figure 1 . 2 to describe the data. We describe each terminal node with the last action 
required to reach that node. Accordingly, terminal nodes are denoted T1, T2 , T3, T4  and P4 .  50 
 
treatments, NIR and FIR, in rounds 15 1−  and in rounds 15 11− . There are 225 matches 
in each fifteen-round session and 196 matches in each fourteen-round session. The data 
from all sessions of a given treatment are pooled. Thus, there are 421 observations for 
treatment NIR and450observations for treatment FIR in rounds 15 11− . 
Figures 3 . 2 and 5 . 2 , where the data from all 15rounds are pooled, show a relatively small 
difference between the aggregate distributions of play in treatments NIR and FIR. Figures 
4 . 2  and 6 . 2 , which show the similar data for the last five rounds of play, reveal larger 
differences. For example, the fraction of total matches that end in the Nash equilibrium 
outcome is about50% for FIR and about  % 33   for  NIR.      
  The effect of information revelation was in the opposite direction than the one 
hypothesized. In fact, hypothesis1 is overwhelmingly rejected by the data. The mean 
payoff per match in rounds 15 11− of treatment NIR is  13 . 2  and in the same rounds of 
FIR the mean payoff is 4 . 1 . The t-test of differences in means with unequal variances 
rejects the null hypothesis of equal payoffs (two-tailed p-value= 0004 . 0 ), but in the 
opposite direction from the one expected! We believe that this result is due to subjects’ 
specific social preferences. In part 5 . 2 we discuss and examine possible types of 
preferences that explain our results. 
  Our data share some of the main features of previous experiments of the centipede 
game. In particular, one major stylized fact from these experiments is that the conditional 
“take” probabilities
43 increase as we move from the first to the last decision node of the 
game. In our data, this was true for all four sessions and all decision nodes. However, in 
                                                 
43 For a decision node, the “conditional take probability” is the fraction of people who chose “take” in this 
node in the experiment, from all the players that moved in this node.  51 
 
the FIR treatment there are some substantial new features. First of all, convergence to the 
Nash equilibrium outcome (T1) is very strong in late rounds, much stronger than in MP. 
To make statistical tests, we assume that in the last five rounds play has converged, and 
therefore each observation is independent of the others. Table 2contains the results and 
p-values of most of the statistical tests and we shall frequently refer to it. We can see that 
the higher frequency of Nash equilibrium play in FIR relative to NIR is statistically 
significant. Moreover, the whole distributions differ substantially and the chi-square test 
shows that this difference is significant. Hence, we can safely conclude that subjects’ 
behavior is different when full information is provided.  
  Moreover, subjects seem to behave differently than in the experiments of MP. In 
the two sessions of the control treatment, NIR1 and NIR2, a large fraction of matches in 
rounds  15 11− ends in the Nash equilibrium outcome (29%and37%) and the 
corresponding fraction is very similar in rounds  10 6−  ( % 29 and % 5 . 38 ). This is much 
larger than the equilibrium fraction found by MP in rounds  10 6−  (8%). We examine the 
difference in the distributions of the pooled data from the NIR sessions, rounds  10 6− , 
with the pooled data from the three 4-move sessions of MP in the same rounds (the data 
are in Appendix1). Using a chi-square test, we overwhelmingly reject the null hypothesis 
of homogeneity, so UCLA subjects seem to exhibit different behavior than Caltech and 
PCC students, since it is clearly not the number of rounds that makes the difference. 
UCLA has a much larger pool of potential subjects than Caltech and hence there may be 
a subject pool effect.  52 
 
  Another very interesting aspect of the data is that in treatment FIR, very few 
YELLOW subjects chose “pass” in the last decision node. This seems to be the key 
reason for the fact that our theoretical predictions failed, and it will be discussed later, 
together with possible explanations. To test whether these differences are statistically 
significant, we make the strong assumption that behavior in the last decision node does 
not depend on the round of the game. This is necessary for getting a sample large 
enough.
44 Hence, we pool all the data from all rounds. Table  3 . 2  contains all the 
statistical results of tests which use data from all rounds of play,  15 1− .We first perform a 
simple test of differences in proportions, pooling all terminal nodes except P4in one 
category. We find that a significantly higher fraction reaches the last terminal node in 
NIR ( 028 . 0 ) relative to FIR ( 0067 . 0 ).  
  A well known weakness of z and chi-square testing, which we have been using so 
far, is when some category has very low “expected frequency”.
45 Therefore, because of 
this problem in category P4, we will also perform Fisher’s exact test whenever the 
expected frequencies for any category are very low and the contingency table is 2 2x . 
Using this test for comparing the last-node proportions in the NIR (N=421) and FIR 
                                                 
44 Performing the test for the data of the last five rounds only, the z-value we get is  86 . 1 −  and the two 
sided p-value is  062 . 0 . Not only does our test have very low power, but also expected frequencies in the 
last terminal node are extremely low, which casts doubt on the results of tests based on asymptotic 
distributions.  
45 There is a large debate in the statistical literature about which test is appropriate for testing hypotheses in 
contingency tables for small and intermediate sample sizes.  Conventional knowledge is that Fisher’s exact 
test is the more appropriate for small samples and chi-square tests for large samples. However, several 
authors question this, and claim that the uncorrected Pearson chi-square test should be used in small 
samples.  See d’Agostino et al (1988).  Cochran (1954 ) also claims that the chi-square test can be used 
even when expected frequencies are small: “…the chi-square tables are an adequate approximation to the 
exact distribution even when some  i m are much lower than5.” See also Sahai and Khurshid (1995) for an 
excellent review of appropriate methods for testing hypotheses in contingency tables depending on the 
specific sampling method.  53 
 
(N=450) we also find the difference statistically significant (see the results in Table 3 . 2 ). 
Thus, we conclude that a higher fraction of total matches ends in the last terminal node 
when no information is provided.  
  However, a better metric of last-node behavior is the conditional “take” 
probability at the last decision node (YELLOW’s second node), given that this node has 
been reached. The conditional take probability in this node for rounds  15 1− of treatments 
FIR and NIR is  % 2 . 94  and  % 2 . 78  respectively. To test for the statistical significance of 
this difference, we consider the sample of all matches that reached the last decision node, 
and test for differences in the proportion of those who passed. ( 55 , 52 = = PIR FIR N N ). 
Both
2 χ and Fisher’s exact test indicate that the difference is statistically significant. We 
conclude that providing aggregate information changed subjects’ behavior in the last 











Object Tested for Equality 







Fraction of T1  NIR( 33 . 0 ) and FIR( 5 . 0 ) z= 77 . 2   0054 . 0  
Fraction of T1  NIR( 33 . 0 ) and PIR 4 . 0 ()   z= 32 . 1   18 . 0  
Fraction of T1  FIR( 5 . 0 ) and PIR 4 . 0 ()   z=1.55  084 . 0  
Fraction of T1  NIR( 33 . 0 ) and NIR-M 
( 096 . 0 ) 
0 . 20
2 = χ   < 0001 . 0
The whole distribution  NIR and FIR  89 . 14
2 = χ   004 . 0  
The whole distribution  NIR and NIRMP  =
2 χ 8 . 35   < 0001 . 0
The whole distribution  NIR, FIR and PIR  =
2 χ 02 . 15   0587 . 0  
The whole distribution  NIR and PIR  98 . 2
2 = χ   56 . 0  
The whole distribution  FIR and PIR  =
2 χ 81 . 6   14 . 0  
The whole distribution  NIR and NIR-M  47 . 26
2 = χ   0003 . 0  
The whole distribution  NIR-M and FIR-M  51 . 14
2 = χ   0058 . 0  







Table 2.3 The Results of Statistical Tests Comparing Data in Rounds 1-15 
 
 
Object Tested for 
Equality Across 







Fraction of P4  NIR( 028 . 0 ) and FIR( 0067 . 0 )  Fisher  0.017 
Fraction of P4   NIR ( 028 . 0 )and FIR( 0067 . 0 ) z= 47 . 2   013 . 0  
Fraction of P4  NIR( 028 . 0 ) and NIR-M( 045 . 0 )  69 . 1
2 = χ   19 . 0  
Fraction of P4  NIR( 028 . 0 ) and PIR( 007 . 0 )  Fisher  0.011 
Fraction of P4  NIR-M( 045 . 0 ) and FIR-M( 091 . 0 )  65 . 7
2 = χ   0056 . 0  
P4/(T4+P4)  NIR( % 2 . 78 ) and FIR( % 2 . 94 )  =
2 χ 7 . 5   017 . 0  
P4/(T4+P4)   NIR( % 2 . 78 ) and PIR( % 6 . 91 )  =
2 χ 1 . 4   042 . 0  
P4/(T4+P4)  NIR( % 2 . 78 ) and PIR( % 6 . 91 )  Fisher   064 . 0  
P4/(T4+P4)  FIR( % 2 . 94 ) and PIR( % 6 . 91 )  27 . 0
2 = χ   6 . 0  
P4/(T4+P4)  NIR, FIR and PIR  =
2 χ 7 . 7   021 . 0  
P4/(T4+P4)  NIR( % 2 . 78 ) and NIR-M( % 84 )  923 . 0
2 = χ   336 . 0  
P4/(T4+P4)  NIR-M( % 84 ) and FIR-M( % 69 )  7 . 8
2 = χ   0031 . 0  56 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Fractions of Rounds in each Terminal Node, Treatment NIR, Rounds 1-15 
 
Figure 2.4 Fractions of Rounds in each Terminal Node, Treatment NIR, Rounds 11-15 57 
 
 
Figure 2.5 Fractions of Rounds in each Terminal Node, Treatment FIR, Rounds 1-15 
 
Figure 2.6 Fractions of Rounds in each Terminal Node, Treatment NIR, Rounds 11-15 58 
 
2.5 Alternative Explanations for Behavior in the Last Decision Node  
  The most intriguing feature of the data in treatments NIR and FIR was the 
rejection of hypothesis1, which was largely due to the fact that very few matches exhibit 
passing at the last decision node. The choice of YELLOW subjects in the last decision 
node cannot be affected by aggregate information if they have standard preferences, 
because monetary payoffs from choosing any alternative at this node are given. (Also, as 
we explain in part8, subjects did not use much signaling in treatment FIR). Furthermore, 
if “pure altruism” could explain YELLOW subjects’ last-node passing behavior, and if 
people had a fixed preference for altruism, we would expect similar “take” probabilities 
in the last decision node in all treatments.
46 Consequently, a “reciprocal altruism”, 
“conformity” or analogous “conditional coordination” interpretation needs to be invoked 
in order to explain the behavioral change.  
  Subjects may tend to conform to the conduct of other people that belong in the 
same group as they do. If a social norm evolves that player2’s do not pass in the last 
decision node, then others follow this. There is a large literature on peer effects, which 
underlines the positive relationship between the actions of an individual and the behavior 
of members that belong to his peer group. Conformity preferences characterize an agent 
who likes to follow the actions that the majority chooses. This type of preferences could 
be described by the following rule: each subject has a “threshold” regarding the fraction 
                                                 
46 This discussion is assuming that subjects do not realize the usefulness of signaling and they do not 
employ it.  We believe that our results in the “information” treatments support this assumption so we will 
not defend it any further.  59 
 
of members in his peer group that follow some action.
47  If the actual population fraction, 
according to the subject’s beliefs, is larger than this threshold, the specific subject also 
follows this action. If the perceived fraction is less than the threshold value, the person 
refrains from performing the action.
48  
  Without aggregate information, YELLOW people have a prior belief about their 
own population fractions of “pass” and “take”, and their last-node play depends on their 
beliefs and their threshold. Perhaps some subjects overestimate their own population 
fraction of “pass”. In other words, without aggregate information, many subjects may 
pass in the last decision node because they mistakenly believe that a large fraction of 
others in their group also does so. However, after they get to see that only few YELLOW 
subjects behave like this, they no longer want to pass because they do not want to belong 
to a small minority. We call this the “peer-group conformity” interpretation.  
  Another possible explanation could be provided by theories of reciprocity, such as 
Levine’s  (1998) model where subjects tend to be generous when they interact with 
“altruistic” people and to be mean towards “spiteful” opponents. An explanation using 
this model is along the lines of the arguments presented in the previous paragraph: 
without aggregate information, people have a prior belief on the distribution of altruism 
in the population, and their play depends on what type of player they expect they are 
matched with. It is plausible that some altruistic subjects’ priors overestimate the 
                                                 
47 Especially if this action involves the tradeoff between material well-being and acting morally. 
48 See Frey and Meier for an argument along these lines.  60 
 
population probability that an opponent is an altruist.
49 If this is true, information 
revelation of aggregate play shows to such “altruistic” persons that the truth is different 
that they think, and they adjust their actions accordingly. We call that the “reciprocity” 
interpretation. Note that psychological game theory can provide a similar explanation in 
terms of social expectations. If the revealed data show that opponents expect people in 
“my group” to behave in a non-reciprocating way, I may as well behave like they expect. 




2.6  Treatment PIR: the Basic Hypotheses and Results  
  We introduced treatments PIR1, PIR2 and PIR3in order to examine more 
carefully the non-strategic reasons for the change in subjects’ behavior when aggregate 
information is provided. Assuming that the “peer-group conformity” interpretation is 
valid, play in the last decision node should be affected only by information about what 
other subjects of the same group do at this decision node. Accordingly, we would expect 
that the behavior of YELLOW subjects in the last decision node, when no information 
about the behavior of their peers is provided, would be similar to behavior in NIR. 
Furthermore, if this is true, then with partial information revelation of the “other” group 
only, we should expect high payoffs and passing behavior. In other words, the reasons for 
convergence to the Nash equilibrium, as specified in part 5 . 2 , should no longer hold.  
                                                 
49 The notion of “false consensus” in psychology describes people’s tendency to believe that other people 
are similar to them.  See Marks and Miller(1987) .  
50 See for example the model by Battigalli and Dufwenberg that captures how guilt affects behavior.    61 
 
 Hypothesis2: Partial information revelation leads to higher average payoffs than 
no information revelation. We test for the equality of average payoffs in treatments PIR 
and NIR.  
 Hypothesis3:  In treatment  PIR, the conditional “take” probability at the last 
decision node does not differ from treatment NIR.   
  Our results provide limited support to the idea that not revealing the behavior of 
the “own” group tends to mitigate the negative effects of aggregate information on social 
payoffs. Average payoff per match in rounds  15 11− of treatment PIR is 79 . 1 , which is 
somewhat higher than in FIR but also lower than in NIR. The t-test for equality of means 
in NIR vs. PIR with different variances has a two-tailed p-value 129 . 0 . Hence, partial 
information revelation tends to decrease average payoffs, not to increase it, but the result 
is not statistically significant. However, partial information seems to have less of a 
negative effect than full information, since the average payoffs in PIR are significantly 
higher than in FIR (t-test, two tailed p-value= 0055 . 0 ). Clearly, session PIR1, where 
average payoffs were much higher than in sessions PIR2and PIR3, is largely responsible 
for this (see the data in Appendix1).  
  The distribution over terminal nodes in PIR is, in some sense, “between” the 
distributions in NIR and PIR. Figures  7 . 2  and 8 . 2  display the distribution over terminal 
nodes for rounds 15 1− and for rounds 15 11−  (the total number of matches in treatment 
PIR is646). These results do not differ very much from the results of FIR, but they do 
tend to be closer to the results of NIR. The test for homogeneity of distributions in nodes 
15 11−   for all three treatments, NIR, FIR and PIR cannot reject the hypothesis of 62 
 
homogeneity. Similarly, the pairwise differences in distribution between NIR and PIR 
and between FIR and PIR are not statistically significant (Table 2 . 2 ). Furthermore, the 
fraction of matches that result in equilibrium play (the first terminal node), in 
rounds 15 11− , does not statistically differ in treatment PIR from the analogous fraction in 
the other treatments.  
 Is  hypothesis3, which claims that partial information revelation cannot affect 
“last-decision node” behavior in the same negative way as full information revelation, 
supported by the data? Clearly, it is not so. The “conditional take probability” in this 
node in all rounds of treatment PIR is  % 6 . 91 , which is very similar to the fraction 
% 2 . 94 of treatment FIR, and much higher than the fraction % 2 . 78 of treatment NIR. 
Hypothesis3is rejected, because the test of homogeneity of last-decision node behavior 
in treatments NIR and PIR yields =
2 χ 1 . 4 , p-value= 042 . 0 . Moreover, the test for 
homogeneity of the last-decision-node conditional take probabilities across all three 
treatments NIR, PIR and FIR rejects the null hypothesis at the % 5 level.  
  However, partial information release does not seem to have a different effect on 
behavior in the last decision node than full information release, since the difference in the 
conditional take probabilities in the last decision node in treatments FIR and PIR is not 
significant. Furthermore, the proportion of total matches that end in the last terminal node 
in treatment NIR is significantly larger than in PIR. It is safe to conclude that both full 
and partial information revelation result in higher conditional “take” probabilities and a 
lower fraction of matches that end in the last terminal node. 63 
 
  The large difference in aggregate play between session PIR1 and sessions PIR2 
and PIR3 is also of interest. It seems that only in session PIR1 subjects behaved in the 
predicted way: behavior in the last decision node did not change much compared to the 
NIR treatment, and average payoffs were high. This implies that the “peer-group 
conformity” theory might have some bite. On the other hand, play in sessions PIR2 and 
PIR3 evolved as in FIR. One explanation for the disparity among the sessions of the PIR 
treatment is that round-per-round information revelation causes play to be path-
dependent. This will be discussed later, since there are also important differences within 
the sessions of treatment FIR-M.  
 
2.7 Treatments NIR-M and FIR-M: The Basic Hypotheses and Their Theoretical 
Underpinnings 
  Recall that in the Modified Payoff treatments, YELLOW subjects who “pass” in 
their last decision node have somewhat higher monetary payoffs than before (3instead 
of 4 . 2 ). We use the modified payoff treatments in order to examine whether aggregate 
information release can be beneficial for social welfare in a setting very similar to FIR, 
where aggregate information has been proven to be detrimental for social welfare. 64 
 
 
Figure 2.7 Fractions of Rounds in each Terminal Node, Treatment PIR, Rounds 1-15 
 
Figure 2.8 Fractions of Rounds in each Terminal Node, Treatment PIR, Rounds 11-15 65 
 
  We anticipate that in the modified payoff treatments, aggregate information will 
increase payoffs, rather than decrease them, and we shall explain the theoretical reasons 
for this. In a setting without information release, YELLOW players who pass in the last 
decision node sacrifice less money than in the game with the original payoffs, and we 
expect that more YELLOW subjects will pass in the last decision node. The purely 
selfish incentive of a GREEN subject then is to pass more in all his nodes, since it is 
more likely that he will end up with 9dollars. Anticipating this, YELLOW subjects 
should also pass more in their first move. This should push the distribution in the 
opposite direction than the Nash equilibrium prediction. So, we expect that, in the 
absence of aggregate information, the new payoffs will lead to more passing behavior in 
general.  
  Now, our results in treatments NIR, FIR and PIR showed that theories of 
“conditional cooperation” explain subjects’ behavior well. When aggregate information is 
released, we expect the psychological “reciprocity incentive” to push the data in the same 
direction as the money-making incentive. This is because now subjects observe a larger 
fraction of their opponents “trusting” them in early nodes. If subjects have a “threshold” 
level of opponents’ aggregate behavior, based on which they positively or negatively 
reciprocate, this threshold is likely to be met after the change in payoffs.
51 If it is the case, 
the net effect of reciprocity, compared to the setting with no information, shall be in the 
direction of increasing payoffs. Moreover, people will be expected to pass more, so they 
                                                 
51It is unlikely that agents shall fully adjust their expectations to the different structure of payoffs. 66 
 
may be inclined to meet these expectations. Hence we predict that, with modified 
payoffs, the effect of information release will be positive for society, rather that negative. 
  Hypothesis4:  Information revelation leads to higher social payoffs in the 
modified payoff treatments.  We test whether average per match payoffs in rounds 
15 11− are the same in treatments NIR-M and FIR-M.  
  Hypothesis5: The conditional “take” probability in the last decision node is 
lower in the NIR-M treatment than in the NIR treatment.  
  Hypothesis6 : The modification in payoffs leads to higher total payoffs in NIR-M 
relative to NIR. We test whether average per match payoffs in rounds  15 11− are the same 
in treatments NIR-M and NIR.  
 
2.7.1 Treatments NIR-M and FIR-M: Results 
  Information revelation really increased payoffs in the modified payoff setting, 
although not significantly. The average per-match payoff in rounds  15 11−  of FIR-M and 
NIR-M is  37 . 3 and 92 . 2  respectively. The one-tailed p-value of the t-test is 061 . 0 , hence 
we cannot reject the hypothesis that payoffs are the same. However, hypothesis 4 gains 
some support from these results. In treatment FIR-M many subjects achieved very high 
payoffs, reaching the last or the penultimate terminal node. A significantly higher fraction 
of matches in rounds  15 1− ended in the last terminal node in treatment FIR-M compared 
to NIR-M. Moreover, a very low fraction of people play the Nash equilibrium strategy in 
NIR-M and a somewhat higher fraction in FIR-M. Apparently, full information revelation 
in the centipede game does not always imply strong convergence to the Nash equilibrium 67 
 
terminal node. On average, information revelation tends to increase social welfare when 
payoffs are modified.  
 Figures  12 . 2 9 . 2 −  display the aggregate distributions of matches that end in each 
terminal node for treatments NIR-M and FIR-M, both for rounds  15 1−  and for 
rounds 15 11− . The distribution of play in late rounds of NIR-M is very different from the 
distribution of NIR, and this result is strongly statistically significant. A very low fraction 
of total matches ends in the first terminal node in treatment NIR-M, even in late rounds, 
and the hypothesis of equality of this fraction with the equilibrium fraction in NIR is 
overwhelmingly rejected. Surprisingly, the conditional “take” probability in the last 
decision node in treatment NIR-M is higher than in treatment NIR ( % 84 vs. % 78 ) but the 
difference is not statistically significant. Thus, hypothesis 5 is rejected. 
   It seems that subjects expect YELLOW people to pass more frequently in the last 
decision node in treatment NIR-M and this expectation is not met. Additionally, the 
conditional “take” probability in the last decision node in treatment FIR-M is only  % 69  
and this is significantly lower than % 84 . Hence, aggregate information has increased the 
willingness of subjects to pass in the last decision node in the treatment with modified 
payoffs. Of course, part of this seemingly altruistic behavior could be due to signaling. 
Moreover, average payoffs in treatment NIR-M are high and hypothesis 6  is supported 
by the data. Average payoffs per match in rounds  15 11− are  13 . 2  for NIR and  92 . 2 for 
NIR-M and this difference is statistically significant (t-test, one-tailed, p-value 002 . 0 ). 
  It is also worth emphasizing that the distribution over terminal nodes in session 
FIR2-M is very different from the distribution in sessions FIR1-M and FIR3-M 68 
 
(Appendix1). This difference is statistically significant with p-value less than 0001 . 0 . 
The reason for this difference is that information revelation introduces path dependence. 
If subjects start by trusting each other and “pass” frequently, information revelation 
combined with reciprocity is likely to increase this tendency. If, on the other hand, 
subjects do not pass much in the early rounds, then pessimism and reciprocity will lead to 
convergence to the Nash equilibrium outcome. This path dependence has also played a 
role in the difference in the results of sessions PIR1 and PIR2, PIR3.  
  The change in the effects of information revelation caused by the moderate 
modification in payoffs is remarkable. Recall that the average per match payoff in the late 
rounds of treatment FIR was equal to 4 . 1 . In treatment FIR-M, which differs from 
treatment FIR in a minor way, average payoff is 37 . 3 , more than double, and of course 
this difference is statistically significant. More importantly, full information reduces total 
payoffs significantly in the treatments with the initial payoff function and somewhat 
increases payoffs in the treatments with the modified payoff function. Therefore, we 




  In the “Information Treatments”, a particular subject’s action in a specific round 
affects the aggregate information released in the subsequent round. Hence, information 
revelation introduces repeated game aspects in treatments FIR, PIR, FIR-M.  69 
 
 
Figure 2.9 Fractions of Rounds in each Terminal Node, Treatment NIR-M, Rounds 1-15 
 
Figure 2.10 Fractions of Rounds in each Terminal Node, Treatment NIR-M, Rounds 11-15 70 
 
 
Figure 2.11 Fractions of Rounds in each Terminal Node, Treatment FIR-M, Rounds 1-15 
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  Participants could sacrifice payoffs in the current round in order to induce more 
cooperative behavior later, especially if they are likely to be the only ones reaching a 
particular node in the current round.
52 This fact makes the low level of cooperation in 
treatments FIR, PIR all the more surprising. In treatments FIR and PIR average payoffs 
are so low that is it tough to imagine that subjects signaled and induced passing behavior. 
We therefore believe that the very few instances of passing in late nodes in PIR and 
especially in FIR, provide strong evidence that signaling was not an important factor.  
  However,  there  seem  to  be a  few  instances  of  signaling  behavior.  Session                        
FIR  2 (Figure 13 . 2 ) is particularly interesting. Within seven rounds, play has already 
shown strong signs of convergence, and the fraction of Nash equilibrium play has 
reached80%. However, at this point, some subjects may have realized that signaling is 
possible and passed in late nodes, possibly as a means to induce more passing in the 
future. Behavior changed for a few rounds and it returned to high frequencies of 
equilibrium play. Even following the successful signaling effort of a few subjects, no 
other signaling efforts were made. Hence, even after seeing its possible benefits, subjects 
failed to use signaling extensively. Moreover, although we have no reason to expect that 
it was easier for subjects to understand the importance of signaling in the sessions with 
modified payoffs, we cannot rule out the possibility that signaling may have played an 
important role in the evolution of play in treatment FIR-M. 
                                                 
52 In the sessions where play converged to the Nash equilibrium outcome, some nodes were never reached 
or very seldom reached. This implies that two subjects could pass in late nodes, in their match, and almost 
single-handedly determine the fractions of play to be revealed in the next round, for these nodes. Other 
subjects may not realize that these data are due to a single decision, and this may induce more passing in 
general and higher payoffs in the long run.  72 
 
  It may also be useful to look at last node-behavior in all sessions. Figure 
14 . 2 shows the “take” probabilities, conditional on that the last decision node was 
reached, in all the “information” and “non-information” sessions. The differences are 
more important than they seem. We should point out once more that the threshold value 
of this probability, bellow which it is profitable for a GREEN subject to pass in the third 
decision node is0.857. In almost all non-information sessions the “take” probability is 
smaller than this threshold value, which implies that a selfish player who knows this 
should pass at all nodes except the last one. In all “information” sessions with the initial 
payoffs, the “take” probability in the last decision node is larger than0.857, so one would 
expect play eventually to unfold to the equilibrium outcome. Hence, the observed 
differences in these probabilities are very important. With modified payoffs, the two 
sessions where the threshold was not exceeded were the ones that achieved high 
frequencies of reaching late nodes and high payoffs. This supports the important role we 
attribute to “last decision node behavior” in explaining our results.  
  The fact that information revelation leads to convergence to the Nash equilibrium 
outcome in our “initial payoff treatments” is important, because it partly explains the 
paradox in the results of MP. As we have seen, there have been many efforts to increase 
the low frequency of equilibrium play in early experiments of the centipede game. 
Researchers have performed experiments where they modified various parameters, such 
as the number of players, the size of the payoffs, the structure of the payoffs, even the 
discrete timing of the game, to check if the divergence from equilibrium play is robust to 
all these changes. Here we show that in exactly the same game, with only different 73 
 
information feedback, equilibrium play is much more common. Even without information 
release, our subjects reach the Nash equilibrium outcome much more frequently. 
  At the same time, we show that aggregate information by no means guarantees 
convergence to Nash equilibrium outcomes under all circumstances. Our results indicate 
that aggregate information can have very different effects regarding convergence to Nash 
equilibrium, even in very similar games. We could tentatively argue that aggregate 
information pushes closer to Nash equilibrium when it reinforces players’ selfish 
motives. For example, information which shows that people act selfishly intensifies this 
behavioral tendency even further and induces more convergence to Nash outcomes. On 
the other hand, information that shows the opposite is more likely to lead far from the 
Nash equilibrium outcome, rather than causing convergence to it.  
  Furthermore, the data support the idea that in environments where the long-run 
state of the economy is likely to be described as a heterogeneous self-confirming 
equilibrium, manipulation of aggregate behavior is possible by means of selective 
aggregate information revelation. This type of manipulation can only be effective if the 
results of aggregate information release are not easily predictable, otherwise the public 
may easily second-guess the intentions of the information revealer. In chapter one we 
showed that selective revelation of the aggregate distributions of actions can push the 
dynamic system to specific long-run states, which may be preferable for the aggregate 
information possessor. We believe that there is more scope to the experimental 
examination of this idea. However, it should be noted this study was not a direct test of 
our theoretical model and the results are only suggestive. Moreover, social preferences 74 
 
seem to have played an important role in subjects’ behavior and to have strongly affected 
our experimental results. This effect is not captured in the theoretical model, which 
assumes standard preferences.     
  Finally, what do our results have to say with respect to the major practical 
question: is aggregate information good for society? Our experimental results suggest 
that it depends on the nature of the revealed data and the type of social preferences they 
are likely to bring into play. In a trust game such as the one we are examining, the major 
issue is whether aggregate information increases trust or not. We have seen that subjects 
seem to have preferences driven by “conditional moral motivation”. Hence, any data, 
which show that people exhibit “enough” trusting behavior, should be revealed, because 
it seems that aggregate information reinforces existing trends in behavior. We have also 
shown that aggregate information release can have opposite effects in different 
circumstances which seem very similar to each other. This means that aggregate 
information release is a risky business. At the same time, aggregate information has 
increased the variance of achieved payoffs across sessions even in treatments where it 
increased average payoffs. This may decrease the desirability of aggregate information 
release even if, on average, it seems to benefit society.  
  Our results offer some support for policies that conceal aggregate information 
when this information is likely to exacerbate existing detrimental or antisocial behaviors. 
An example of such a policy is selective information release of aggregate behavior in 
financial markets, which tries to increase optimism and to prevent panic. Our results also 
indicate that overemphasizing corruption or the cynical attitudes of officials at the wrong 75 
 
moment may do more harm than good for a society. Finally, it is worth emphasizing that 
economic effects have of course to be taken into account, but they are not the only 
criterion by which to judge the desirability of aggregate information. Values such as 














    Figure 2.13 An Example of Dynamic Evolution of Play 








































































Figure 2.14 Conditional “Take” Probabilities 
 




  We conducted an experimental investigation of the centipede game where 
subjects received information about the aggregate fractions of each population that chose 
each action. Using payoffs similar to MP, we found that, contrary to the predictions of 
FL, both full and partial information release causes convergence to the Nash equilibrium 
outcome and low payoffs. With slightly modified payoff functions, full aggregate 
information increased subjects’ average earnings. This provides evidence that the optimal 
information release scheme in trust games is to reveal optimistic information selectively, 
because aggregate information does not guarantee convergence to Nash equilibrium or 
higher social payoffs in all circumstances. However, our results also showed that it is 
generally difficult to predict a priori how play will be affected by information revelation, 
and that this type of period-by-period information release may be sensitive to the 
uncertainty of initial play. We also found evidence that agents’ behavior is driven by 
conditional cooperation because our results do not seem compatible with other types of 
preferences.   
  Further study can improve our understanding. Future experiments should be able 
to illuminate many aspects of play. First of all, an explicitly selective information 
revelation scheme could be used. For example, the fractions of play could be revealed 
only when they exceed a certain threshold level. Experiments using this method could 
examine the degree to which subjects understand the fact that they are exposed to 
selective information, and their response to such a realization. Moreover, there are 
reasons to expect that revealing aggregate data about more than one round could lead to 78 
 
different results, because time-dependence would decrease and profitable signaling would 
be impossible. Furthermore, our rich data set can be used for quantitatively testing 
specific theories. In particular, it would be interesting to examine how individuals 
respond to aggregate information, estimating a model that assigns subjects to “types”, 
based on the nature of their response to aggregate information, as in Frey and Meier 


















Appendix 1. Descriptive Data for all Sessions 
 
Results from Session NIR 1 
    Number of matches that finished in the particular node 
   T1 T2 T3 T4  P4
Sum of all rounds   52 90 53 23  7
Sum of last 5   22 29 14 8  2
 
    
Fraction of all games in rounds 1-15 ending in each node      
T1 T2  T3  T4  P4    
0.231 0.4  0.236  0.102  0.031     
Fraction of all games in rounds 11-15 ending in each node    
T1 T2  T3  T4  P4    
0.293 0.387  0.187  0.107  0.027     
Rounds 6-10            
T1 T2  T3  T4  P4    
0.293 0.453  0.133  0.093  0.027     
Implied TAKE probability given a node has been reached      
  T1 T2  T3  T4   
Rounds 1-15  0.231 0.52  0.639  0.767    




Rounds 11-15  
  




Results from Session NIR 2 
Number of matches that finished in the particular node   
  T1 T2 T3 T4  P4 
Sum of all rounds  60 68 43 20  5 
Sum of Last 5  26 27 13  3  1 
 
Fraction of all games in rounds 1-14 ending in each node 
T1  T2 T3 T4 P4  
0.306122449  0.346939 0.219388 0.102041 0.02551   
Fraction of all games in rounds 10-14 ending in each node 
T1  T2 T3 T4 P4  
0.371428571  0.3857 0.1857 0.0428 0.0142  
Rounds 6-10        
T1  T2 T3 T4 P4  
0.385  0.371  0.1857 0.0428 0.0142  
Implied TAKE Probability given a node has been reached 
  T1 T2 T3 T4  
Rounds 1-14  0.306122 0.5  0.632353 0.8   













Results from Session FIR 1 
  Number of matches that finished in each node 
 T1  T2  T3  T4  P4 
Sum of all rounds  34 76  76  37 2 
Sum of last  5  27 32  14  2  0 
Fraction of all games in rounds 1-15 ending in each node  
T1 T2  T3  T4  P4 
0.151 0.338  0.338  0.165  0.009 
Fraction of all games in rounds 11-15 ending in each node 
T1 T2  T3  T4  P4 
0.36 0.427  0.187  0.027  0 
                    Implied TAKE probability given a node has been reached 
 T1  T2  T3  T4 
Rounds 1-15  0.151 0.398  0.660  0.949 
Rounds 11-15  0.36 0.667  0.875  1 
Results from MP, 4-move, Normal Payoffs, Rounds  10 6− ,  136 = N  
    Number of matches that finished in the particular node
   T1 T2 T3 T4 P4
No. of Matches    11 56 52 14 3
Fraction    0.081 0.412 0.382 0.103 0.022
 
Results from NIR, Rounds  10 6− ,  145 = N  
    Number of matches that finished in the particular node
   T1 T2 T3 T4 P4
No. of Matches    49 60 23 10 3









Average payoffs  20.55 4.075  
 
Results from session FIR 2 
  Number of matches that finish in each node   
        T1             T2 T3 T4 P4 
Sum of all rounds  102 77 33 12 1 
Sum of last 5   48 21 5 1 0 
 
Fraction of games in rounds 1-15 ending in each node   
T1 T2  T3  T4  P4 
0.453 0.342  0.147  0.053  0.0044 
Fraction of games in rounds 11-15 ending in each node   
T1 T2  T3  T4  P4 
0.64 0.28  0.067  0.013  0 
Implied TAKE probability given a node has been reached   
 T1  T2  T3  T4 
Rounds 1-15  0.453 0.626  0.72  0.923 












Results from Session PIR1 
  Number of matches that finish in each node   
 T1 T2 T3 T4  P4
Sum of all rounds  15 86 79 41 4
Sum of last 5  6 31 24 12 2
 
Fraction of all games in rounds 1-15 ending in  each node   
T1 T2  T3  T4  P4   
0.067 0.382  0.351  0.1822  0.018   
Fraction of all games in rounds 11-15 ending in each node   
T1 T2  T3  T4  P4   
0.08 0.413  0.32  0.16  0.027   
Implied TAKE probability given a node has been reached     
 T1  T2  T3  T4   
Rounds 1-15  0.067 0.41  0.637  0.91   
















Results from Session PIR2 
  Number of matches that finish in the particular node   
  T1 T2 T3 T4  P4
SUM of all rounds  67 78 43 7  1 
Sum of last 5  37 25 8  0  0 
Sum of 9 first  30 53 35 7  1 
       
 
 
Fraction of all games in rounds 1-14 ending in each node    
T1  T2 T3 T4 P4  
0.341  0.398 0.22  0.036 0.005   
Fraction of all games in rounds 11-14 ending in each node    
T1  T2 T3 T4 P4  
0.529 0.358  0.114285714  0  0   
Implied TAKE probability given a node has been reached     
  T1 T2 T3 T4   
Rounds 1-14  0.341 0.605 0.843 0.875   











Results from Session PIR 3 
  Number of matches that finish in each node     
  T1  T2 T3 T4  P4
Sum of all rounds   93  84 41 7  0 
Sum of last five  49 23  3  0  0 
SUM OF FIRST 10  44  61 38 7  0 
















Fraction of all games in rounds 1-15 ending in each node 
T1                                T2                              T3                     T4                     P4 
0.413 0.373  0.182  0.031  0 
Fraction of all games in rounds 11-15 ending in each node   
T1 T2  T3  T4  P4 
0.653 0.306  0.04  0  0 
Implied TAKE probability given a node has been reached   
 T1  T2  T3  T4 
Rounds 1-15  0.4133 0.636  0.854  1 






Average payoffs  12.1 2.67  86 
 
 
Results from Session NIR 1-M 
  Number of matches that finished in each node 
 T1  T2  T3  T4  P4 
Sum of all rounds  24 83  73  39 6 
Sum of last  5  11 29  25  8  2 
         
 
Fraction of all games in rounds 1-15 ending in each node  
T1 T2  T3  T4  P4 
0.107 0.369  0.325  0.173  0.027 
Fraction of all games in rounds 11-15 ending in each node 
T1 T2  T3  T4  P4 
0.146 0.387  0.333  0.107  0.027 
                    Implied TAKE probability given a node has been reached 
 T1  T2  T3  T4 
Rounds 1-15  0.107 0.412  0.618  0.867 













Results from Session NIR 2-M 
  Number of matches that finished in each node 
 T1  T2  T3  T4  P4 
Sum of all rounds  1 41  58  57  12 
Sum of last  5  0 18  31  15  1 
         
 
Fraction of all games in rounds 1-15 ending in each node  
T1 T2  T3  T4  P4 
0.006 0.242  0.343  0.337  0.007 
Fraction of all games in rounds 11-15 ending in each node 
T1 T2  T3  T4  P4 
0 0.276  0.476  0.23  0.15 
                    Implied TAKE probability given a node has been reached 
 T1  T2  T3  T4 
Rounds 1-15  0.006 0.244  0.457  0.826 














Results from Session FIR 1-M 
  Number of matches that finished in each node 
 T1  T2  T3  T4  P4 
Sum of all rounds  5 91  56  53  20 
Sum of last  5  5 31  14  18  7 

















Fraction of all games in rounds 1-15 ending in each node  
T1 T2  T3  T4  P4 
0.022 0.404  0.249  0.235  0.089 
Fraction of all games in rounds 11-15 ending in each node 
T1 T2  T3  T4  P4 
0.067 0.413  0.187  0.24  0.093 
                    Implied TAKE probability given a node has been reached 
 T1  T2  T3  T4 
Rounds 1-15  0.022 0.413  0.434  0.726 







Average payoffs  29 9.4  89 
 
 
Results from Session FIR 2-M 
  Number of matches that finished in each node 
 T1  T2  T3  T4  P4 
Sum of all rounds  61 109  38  15 2 
Sum of last  5  36 30  6  3  0 

















Fraction of all games in rounds 1-15 ending in each node  
T1 T2  T3  T4  P4 
0.271 0.484  0.168  0.067  0.009 
Fraction of all games in rounds 11-15 ending in each node 
T1 T2  T3  T4  P4 
0.48 0.4  0.08  0.04  0 
                    Implied TAKE probability given a node has been reached 
 T1  T2  T3  T4 
Rounds 1-15  0.271 0.664  0.69  0.882 







Average payoffs  14.7 3.6  90 
 
 
Results from Session FIR 3-M 
  Number of matches that finished in each node 
 T1  T2  T3  T4  P4 
Sum of all rounds  2 30  82  71  40 
Sum of last  5  0 11  29  26  9 

















Fraction of all games in rounds 1-15 ending in each node  
T1 T2  T3  T4  P4 
0.009 0.133  0.364  0.315  0.178 
Fraction of all games in rounds 11-15 ending in each node 
T1 T2  T3  T4  P4 
0 0.147  0.387  0.347  0.12 
                    Implied TAKE probability given a node has been reached 
 T1  T2  T3  T4 
Rounds 1-15  0.009 0.134  0.425  0.639 

















Welcome to CASSEL. The policy in this lab is never to deceive participants. This is an 
experiment in group decision making, and you will be paid for your participation in cash, 
at the end of the experiment. Different participants may earn different amounts. What you 
earn depends partly on your decisions, partly on the decisions of others, and partly on 
chance. Please turn off all pagers and cell phones now.  
 
The entire experiment will take place through computer terminals, and all interaction 
between you will take place through the computers. It is important that you do not talk, or 
in any way try to communicate with others during the experiment.  
 
We will start with a brief instruction period. During the instruction period you will be 
given a description of the main features of the experiment and will be shown how to use 
the computers. If you have any questions during the instruction period, please raise your 
hand and your question will be answered so anyone can hear. If you have any difficulties 92 
 
after the experiment has begun, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come 
and assist you.  
 
You will be divided into two groups, each containing ___ people. The groups will be 
labeled the GREEN and the YELLOW group. The computer you are using will assign 
you to one of the two groups. If you are assigned to be GREEN you will be GREEN 
throughout the experiment. If you are assigned to be YELLOW you will be YELLOW 
throughout the experiment.  
 
A Decision Problem 
 
In this experiment, you will be participating in the following interaction, for real money.  
 
In each round you will be matched with a person of the other color. During each move of 
a particular round, either you or the person you are matched with makes an action. The 
payoffs for you, and for the person you are matched with, depend on the moves you both 
make.  
 
In pages 6 and 7 of the instructions you see an illustration of a specific round based on 
the experiment screen.  
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There are two piles of money: a Large Pile and a Small Pile. At the beginning of the 
round, the Large Pile has 60 cents and the Small Pile has 15 cents. 
 
GREEN has the first move and can either pass or take the pile. If GREEN chooses 
“Take”, GREEN gets the Large Pile of 60 cents, YELLOW gets the Small Pile of 15 
cents, and the round is over. If GREEN chooses “Pass”, both piles double and it is 
YELLOW’s turn.  
 
The Large Pile now contains 1.20 dollars and the Small Pile 30 cents. Now YELLOW 
can take or pass the pile. If YELLOW takes, YELLOW ends up with the Large Pile of 
1.20 dollars and GREEN gets the Small Pile of 30 cents and the round is over. If 
YELLOW passes, both piles double and it is GREEN’s turn again. 
 
The Large Pile now contains 2.40 dollars and the Small Pile 60 cents. GREEN can again 
take or pass the pile. If GREEN takes, GREEN ends up with the Large Pile of 2.40 
dollars and YELLOW ends up with the Small Pile of 60 cents and the round is over. If 
GREEN passes, both piles double and it is YELLOW’s turn again. 
 
The Large Pile now contains 4.80 dollars and the Small Pile 1.20 dollars. This is the last 
move, and it is YELLOW’s second choice. If YELLOW takes the pile, YELLOW ends 
up with the Large Pile of 4.80 dollars and GREEN gets the Small Pile of 1.20 dollars and 
the round is over. If YELLOW passes, then the piles double again. GREEN then gets the 94 
 
Large Pile of 9.60 dollars and YELLOW gets the Small Pile of 2.40 dollars. Note that 
this is not an actual move, since GREEN has only one choice. 
 
After the end of the first round, you will have the opportunity to get information about 
what all the YELLOW people and all the GREEN people chose in the previous round. In 
particular, for each of the moves, you will see the fraction of the people who chose 
“Take” and the fraction that chose “Pass” in the previous round.  For example, during the 
third round, you will see information that refers to the behavior of participants in the 
second round. 
 
  In the first box, the GREEN people move. The numbers under the word “History” 
represent the fractions of GREEN people who chose “Take” and the fraction of the 
GREEN people who chose “Pass”, in this move, in the previous round. Similarly, in the 
second box, the YELLOW people move. In the second box, the numbers under the word 
“History” represent the fractions of the YELLOW people who chose “Take” and the 
fraction of the YELLOW people who chose “Pass”, in this particular move, in the 
previous round. 
 
 Note that not all the YELLOW people need have moved in this box in the previous 
round. Remember that all boxes, except the first one, are reached only if the other player 
chooses “Pass” in the previous box. The numbers under “History” have the same 95 
 
meaning in the other boxes. If a box does not have “History”, this implies that this box 
was never reached in the previous round.  
 
The experiment consists of ____ rounds. In each round you will interact with a person of 
the different color. So this person will be GREEN if you are YELLOW and YELLOW if 
you are GREEN. You will not be matched with the same person twice, as there are _____ 
people of the other color. So you will be matched with each person of the other color 




We will now start the instruction session. During the instruction session, we will teach 
you how to use the computers by going through three practice rounds. During the 
instruction period please do not hit any key unless you are instructed to. You will not be 
paid for the practice rounds. Please wait until we set up the experiment.  
 
Please double click on the small red icon labeled “MC”. When the computer prompts for 
your name, please type the number of the computer you are in, for example if you are at 
computer 14, type “SSEL 14”. Then, please hit the “SUBMIT” key.  
 
Now you should all have a window saying: “Please Wait. Connecting to Server”. Please 
do not close any windows. 96 
 
  
Now all of you should be able to see the experiment screen. The experiment screen 
should display five boxes. Remember that the last box does not describe a real move 
since GREEN can only choose “Take”.  You see that the first match has begun. The box 
with the red color represents the current move, in which, one of the two participants has 
to make a choice. If it is your turn to move, you are given a description of the choices 
available to you. 
 
 If you are told in the first box that this is your move, and you have the choice menu, you 
are a GREEN participant. If you are told to wait for your partner to make his/her 
decision, you are a YELLOW participant. You will have the same color throughout the 
experiment. Please record your color and computer number in your record sheet. You 
need to record your computer number since you will be paid according to this number. 
 
We will now start the first practice round. Will all the GREEN participants please choose 
PASS from your menu now? 
 
GREEN participants now receive a message that they have passed, and now the other 
person (YELLOW) will get the opportunity to take or pass the pile. YELLOW 
participants now receive a message that the person they are matched with (GREEN) has 
passed the pile, and now they will have the move. Please do not forget to click “OK” on 
your information icons each time.  97 
 
 
Since GREEN chose PASS, the second box now has the red color, and the YELLOW 
person now has the choice menu, indicating that it is YELLOW’S move. The GREEN 
participants are told that it is the other person’s turn to choose. Notice that there is now a 
large pile of 1.2 dollars and a small pile of 30 cents. 
 
Will all the YELLOW participants please choose TAKE from you menu now? 
 
Since YELLOW chose TAKE, the round has ended. A message informs that you or the 
other participant, depending on your color, has taken the pile, and tells you your payoffs.  
Please record your payoffs to the record sheet provided. You must do so after every 
round in order to double-check your payoffs are correct. 
 
You are not being paid for the practice session, but if this was the real experiment, then 
the payoffs you have recorded would be money you have earned from the first round, and 
you would be paid this amount for that round at the end of the experiment. The total you 
earn over all the _____ real rounds, plus your guaranteed show up fee of five dollars, is 
what you will be paid for your participation in the experiment. 
 
We will now proceed to the second practice round. You now see that you have been 
matched with a new person of the opposite color and that the second round has begun. 
Does everyone see this? 98 
 
 
The rules for the second round are exactly like the first, but now you can observe the way 
participants played in the first practice round. The numbers at the lower part of the boxes, 
under the word “History”, represent the fractions of “Take” and “Pass” decisions of 
participant the previous match. In the first box, you are being informed that that all the 
GREEN persons have chosen “Pass” in their first decision in the previous round.  
 
Similarly, in the second box, which corresponds to the second move of the round, but 
only to the first decision of the YELLOW participants, you are informed that all the 
YELLOW people who moved chose “Take” in their first decision. The other boxes do 
not have numbers because there were no decisions at all to be revealed: no GREEN or 
YELLOW participants reached their second move.  Remember that the fractions under 
“History” refer only to the preceding round, not all the previous rounds completed. 
 
Now you are free to choose whatever you want in the next two practice rounds. Please 
stop after you have completed the third practice round. Please record your payoffs to the 
record sheet provided, but remember you are not paid for the practice rounds. Please 
remember to record your payoffs after each real round. 
 
This concludes the practice session. In the actual experiment there will be ____ rounds 
instead of three, and of course, it will be up to you to make your own decisions. You will 
not see any history in the first round. Remember that you will meet each person of the 99 
 
other color exactly once. At the end of round ____, the experiment ends and we will pay 
each of you privately in cash, the total amount you have accumulated during all real 
rounds, plus your guaranteed five dollar participation fee. No other person will be told 
how much cash you earned in the experiment. You need not tell any other participants 
how much you earned. 
 
We will now begin with the actual experiment. If there are any problems from this point 

















Chapter 3. Campaign Contributions as a Commitment Device 
 
3. 1 Introduction  
  We propose a new channel through which institutions that allow for private 
campaign contributions
53 may affect economic efficiency. Contributions may serve as a 
commitment device that helps keep control over the expectations of the private sector 
about economic policy, especially with respect to important macroeconomic indices. The 
basic argument of this paper is that society as a whole may benefit from this institution if 
it helps solve dynamic inconsistency problems and induce investments. If the investment 
decisions of private firms determine economic growth and employment, as is the case in 
most capitalist economies, voters have a common interest in making their governments 
commit to policies that encourage private investments. However, governing parties may, 
in general, renege on promises for economic stability and choose excessively leftist 
policies if direct policy commitment is impossible. Campaign contributions or media 
control by firm interests tend to restraint the scope of this opportunism and provide a 
commitment device.
54 This is achieved if the private sector in the political game gets to 
                                                 
53 Throughout this paper, “campaign contributions” will be understood either as monetary amounts given to 
the candidates or parties and used for campaigning, or as contributions “in kind”, such as favorable media 
influence in favor of a given party. As will become clear in our model, the main results depend on the 
ability of the corporate sector to influence the elections, not on how this is influence is achieved. One 
example of an institution that allows for monetary contributions is a legal framework that institutionalizes 
them, while an example of an institution that allows for contributions in kind is a regime of legal private 
media. 
54 One may ask: why do we assume that only firms offer campaign contributions? The important issue, 
from our perspective, is whether the firm sector is sufficiently more influential in elections than the labor 
sector. Our results do not change if we also allow for campaign contributions of labor unions. If the 
campaign contributions of firms are sufficiently more influential than the contributions of labor unions, 
then the results of our model follow. We assume that, unless legal, institutional and technological 
constraints prohibit any type of influence, firms will generally tend to be more influential in elections, for 101 
 
move after the policy is chosen, contributing (in money or media support) to the 
governing party or to its rivals. Anticipating this, the governing party will choose not to 
follow opportunistic policies and firms will choose a high level of investment and society 
as a whole may benefit.  
  The question about the effects of campaign contributions on economic efficiency 
is especially important because in the recent years its role has been extensively discussed 
in the United States and other countries and many types of campaign finance reform have 
been proposed. Consequently, political scientists, economists and other social scientists 
have been examining the economic and social implications of campaign contributions. 
For example, Levitt (1995) refers to three main criticisms of the system of congressional 
campaign finance in the United States. First, fundraising is an important activity for 
candidates, which requires too many resources, especially in terms of the time constraints 
of politicians; hence they may not be able to carry out their more important tasks. 
Second, it is argued that the system of contributions and fundraising may be biased 
towards incumbents. Thirdly, an important consideration is whether organized interest 
groups exert excessive influence on politics. To these arguments one may add that the 
system is may be biased towards right-wing candidates, since the majority of special 
interest groups are thought to relate to the corporate sector. Finally, an additional 
criticism asserts that increasing campaign money, after some level of expenditure has 
                                                                                                                                                 
two reasons. First, the monetary contributions of the firm sector are usually higher than those of labor 
unions, and second, owners of private media tend to have more connections with private firms than with 
labor unions. Of course, we do not claim that the results of our model are universal; if in a specific 
economy some of the assumptions we make are not true, then the model is not relevant for this economy. 
We do believe that our assumptions are reasonable and relevant for a large class of economies.  
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been made, has no important effect on social welfare; therefore there is a waste of 
resources. These are just some of the arguments against campaign contributions. 
   There are some moral arguments in favor of campaign contributions, such as 
freedom of speech and the value of independent (from the state) political parties in 
democracy. The discussion concerning the potential positive economic effects of the 
institution of private campaign contributions has been growing, partly because of the 
previously mentioned criticisms. Theoretical papers have considered conditions, under 
which, the institution of campaign contributions contributes to economic efficiency. In 
particular, it has been argued that contributions may inform voters about the quality of 
candidates or their exact positions in the political spectrum. This can be done with two 
ways: either political advertising is directly informative of the qualities of politicians,
55 or 
it signals a hidden ability of a candidate that the voters do not observe but the interest 
groups do.
56 However, the arguments of the first type do not answer one basic question, 
namely why society tolerates special interest contributions, because the perceived 
benefits of information come from campaigning in general, privately or publicly funded. 
However, the signaling literature does offer an argument for the efficiency of private 
campaign contributions.
57 
  This paper explores an alternative argument for the efficiency of private campaign 
contributions that does not necessarily contradict the information argument. Attention 
will be focused mainly on policies affecting the returns to capital and on possible 
                                                 
55 The papers by Austen-Smith (1987) and Coate (2001) are representative of this literature.  
56 See Prat (1999).  
57 We shall discuss the literature more in the next part. 103 
 
commitments referring to these policies. In the absence of campaign contributions, the 
incumbent party will choose opportunistic policies despite the fact that the commitment 
outcome is better for the economy if commitment cannot be directly enforced. 
Accordingly, rational firms would not invest and the economy would be trapped in a bad 
equilibrium because direct commitment is impossible in the political process.
58 However, 
under commitment, the incumbent party would respect its promises because otherwise it 
will be penalized and significantly undermine its reelection prospects. The important 
result is that society as a whole, including people who earn mostly labor income, may 
benefit from the establishment of this institution. This is despite the fact that the resulting 
corporate influence in elections may work against the choice of a labor-friendly policy. 
The reason is that in the long run the whole economy will benefit enough from the higher 
level of investments in the economy, which is attained by enforcing the commitment to a 
more capital-friendly policy. Campaign contributions can therefore substitute for direct 
commitment when is impossible to enforce such commitment.  
  In part  2 . 3  the relationship between our model and the existing literature is 
discussed. In part  3 . 3  the setting of the formal model is presented. The benchmark case 
of credible commitment is discussed in part  4 . 3 . In part  5 . 3 the equilibria of the 
subgames with and without campaign contributions are found and it is shown that in the 
unique equilibrium of the whole game voters approve the institution of campaign 
contributions. The results are discussed in part  6 . 3 . We briefly present some examples 
from specific economies, in which our model is relevant, in part  7 . 3 . Part   8 . 3 concludes.  
                                                 
58 The book by Dixit (1996) thoroughly examines the implications of this idea.  104 
 
 
3.2  Related Literature 
  Kydland and Prescott (1977) underline the importance of policy rules that are 
unalienable except under very extreme conditions. This importance stems from the well-
known problem of time inconsistency that occurs when policy-making is a dynamic 
process. If this idea is true in real economic policy, then policy rules and commitment are 
important. Hence, one may be interested examining these specific institutions that ensure 
that policy rules are enforced.
59 One very important example of such an institution is the 
independent central bank with a “conservative director”. We argue that private campaign 
contributions can be understood as an institution attaining similar results.  
  Our idea resembles the notion of strategic delegation, which is discussed in 
Person and Tabellini (1994). This refers to the electoral support by some voters of 
candidates that may not share their preferences about policy. This can be the case when, 
for example, the elections cannot be won by candidates that share the preferences of these 
voters. A model with similarities with our model is presented in Person and Tabellini 
(1994) pp. 318-323. Here, middle-income voters may vote for candidates that would 
protect the profitability of capital more than they themselves would like to. This is 
because after elections take place, capital accumulation decisions are made on the basis 
of predictions about policy, which is enacted subsequently. These accumulation decisions 
affect the welfare of all, as in our model. Thus, Person and Tabellini also view this 
                                                 
59 It is worth noting that commitment may not necessarily require the existence of an institution. 
Reputation-building might be enough to ensure that politicians will not behave opportunistically. The 
literature on reputation is large. See, for example, Person and Tabellini, pp. 314-315.  105 
 
seemingly paradoxical mechanism of strategic voting as enforcing society’s commitment 
on policies that induce investments.   
  The notion that wage earners may like an institution that protects the rights of 
capital has been examined in the political science literature. This is closely related with 
the idea of “structural dependence” of democratic governments on capital. This view 
claims that the policy-making of a modern democratic state is structurally constrained; 
this is because investment decisions of wealth holders affect the future economic 
conditions for the economy as a whole.
60 Therefore governments have to take into 
account the effect of their policies on investments and growth and voters realize this. 
Przeworsky and Wallerstein (1988) introduce and test the idea of structural dependence 
using a formal model. They show that without effective government intervention, wage 
earners are constrained in their demands. They also show how a tax on consumption of 
profit-earners can relax this constraint, invalidating “structural dependence”. Yet, in the 
dynamic setting, where expectations matter, governments are constrained for the usual 
reasons of credibility of promises for capital accumulation.  
  The literature on monetary campaign contributions is large as well. In terms of its 
structure, our model has similarities with the model of Snyder and Ting (2005). They also 
use a model with voters, (a representative voter) interest groups and parties to examine 
the importance of elections as a means to control the performance of politicians. 
However, their focus is mainly in comparing the incentive to control performance versus 
the incentive to elect good types of politicians. It is interesting to note that they use an 
                                                 
60 See Przeworsky and Wallerstein, (1988). 106 
 
alternative assumption regarding the effect of a contribution or a “bribe”. A “bribe” from 
the interest group directly increases the utility of the party, whereas in our model it only 
affects the probabilities of reelection.  
  It has already been said that the economic effects of campaign contributions have 
been examined in the literature. One important strand of the literature examines 
informative advertising. These papers assume that money spent on campaigning may 
promote advertising that increases voters’ knowledge about the candidates’ abilities or 
positions.  Austen-Smith’s work (1987) is the first that tries to explain the existence of 
campaign contributions assuming informative advertising. He notes that advertising for a 
particular candidate decreases the uncertainty that risk-averse voters face regarding his 
policy position, making this candidate a better choice. Coate (2001) argues that when 
advertising is informative - for example when it presents verifiable records of the 
candidates’ deeds - campaign contributions may promote the choice of a candidate that 
moderates like. This is done when the two parties choose partisan or moderate 
candidates. Advertising can induce the choice of moderates because the group of swing 
voters prefers them, but they need information about the ideology of candidates. In other 
words, parties get away with choosing partisans only if moderate voters do not get 
information through advertising.  
  A different approach has been to consider campaign advertising as a signal. Pratt 
(1999) develops a formal model that assumes that the valence of candidates is more 
known to the special interest groups than to voters. Accordingly, these groups are more 
likely to contribute to better candidates since they know that these candidates are more 107 
 
likely to win. This implies that the level of contributions a candidate gets signals his type. 
Allowing campaign contributions may be efficient if the benefits of this information for 
society exceed the costs of distorting the political promises of candidates. Hence, this 
model derives a rationalization of the institution of campaign contributions by special 
interest groups, unlike the directly informative advertising models. Our model also offers 
a natural explanation for this institution in terms of efficiency.  
 
3.3 The Setting of the Model 
  The main ideas are analyzed in a simple model with investment decisions, policy 
choices and elections. Following a large strand of literature, and in particular Kiewiet and 
Rivers (1984, p.7), we assume that voting is retrospective, responds to actual policy 
outcomes, and is incumbency-oriented in the sense that voters seek to discipline or 
reward incumbents for their economic policy. We show that if corporate campaign 
contributions are not institutionalized, in which case they are illegal and we assume they 
do not exist,  the time inconsistency problem makes the incumbent party choose a labor-
friendly policy. This is because we assume that the constituency consists of wage-earners 
that prefer such a policy. Anticipating this, firms do not invest and all players are worse 
off. If the government could commit to the capital-friendly policy this would improve 
social welfare, but without legal campaign contributions the enforcement of this 
commitment is not possible. Consequently, voters accept the existence of this institution 
because it makes them better off.   
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3.3.1 The Players and the Pure Strategy Spaces 
  There are two parties, an incumbent party (I ) and a challenger party (C ). There 
is one group of voters, the middle class (M ), which has a continuum of voters. Finally, 
there is the firm sector (F ).  PlayerC  , the challenger party, never gets to move in our 
model but is used for expositional reasons.   
  This is a simple four-stage model. In stage zero, voters vote whether to accept or 
reject the existence of the institution of private campaign contributions. We shall explain 
later what this institution exactly does. The pure strategy space of voter j in stage zero 
is{ } , ar , whereadenotes accepting the institution of private campaign contributions and 
r  rejecting them. In stage one the firm sector decides whether to choose a high or low 
level of investment. Denote with xthe level of investment, wherex h = means that the 
investment is high and x l = means that the investment is low. The firm sector at that 
point knows the choice of voters at stage zero, so that the pure strategy space of F in 
stage one is the set of all functions mapping{ } , ar onto{ } , hl  that is, the set{ } ,,, hh hl lh ll . 
For example,lhis the strategy “choose low investment” if awas the majority decision in 
stage zero and “choose high investment” if r was decided by the majority.  
  In stage two the incumbent party I decides whether to implement labor-friendly 
policy or employer-friendly policy. Denote by s the policy choice, wheresL =  means 
labor-friendly policy andsE =  means employer-friendly policy. Since the party knows 
both the voters’ choice and the firms’ choice at the previous stages, the pure-strategy 
space for the incumbent party is the set of all mappings of the 109 
 
form { } { } { } :, , , f ar hl LE ×→ . In stage three, elections take place and voters decide if 
they vote for the incumbent or the challenger party. Notice that voters differ within the 
group. So any pure strategy equilibrium must specify a pure strategy for each voter of the 
group. Accordingly, the pure strategy space of voter j is the space of all mappings of the 
form { } { } { } { } :, , , , IC qa r h l L E V V ×× → . All equilibria we will find are pure strategy 
equilibria.  
 
3.3.2 The Payoff Functions 
 Firms: the payoffs of firms are their profits, realized in stage two. They depend on 
whether they invested or not and on the policy choice of the incumbent party. Let 
) , ( x s π be the profit function of firms. The critical property of this function is the 
following:  
 Assumption  1: ) , ( ) , ( h L l L π π > and ) , ( ) , ( l E h E π π >  
  This says that if the policy is labor-friendly the firm sector is better off having 
invested low and if the policy is capital-friendly the opposite is true. This seems 
reasonable given that investments entail some fixed costs and increase productive 
capacity. The function π  incorporates these costs here. If the variable costs of production 
are high enough, then the optimal choice of the firm sector is not to produce a large 
quantity. It is a logical assumption that variable costs depend on minimum wages, 
insurance regulations, capital taxation and more parameters that are incorporated in the 
policies E  and L.  110 
 
 Parties: the payoff of the two parties is a fixed amount Ω that they get if they are 
elected in stage three. They get zero if they are not elected. We assume that the utility 
from choosing any level of policy in stage two is zero. In other words, parties have no 
preference for any particular policy. This assumption is not necessary for the results.  
 Voters: the payoffs of voters are additive and they depend on which of the two 
parties gets elected.  
  For agent j in the utility function is: 
(,, , ) (,) (,) jj j us x v s x p s x σ δσ δ =++ +      , if I wins. 
(,, , ) (,) jj us x v s x σ δ =                                 , if C wins. 
  We shall explain in detail what these different terms mean and their important 
properties. First of all, the utility of voters depends on the current policy and investment 
according to the payoff function (,) vsx enjoyed in stage two. The important thing to note 
is that this term does not depend on who gets elected: it is simply the realized payoff, that 
is, the utility of consumption goods. This term therefore does not affect the elections but 
it does affect the welfare properties of equilibria. 
 Assumption  2:  (,) vsh> (,) vsl for anys and  (,) vLx (,) vEx ≥ for any x 
  The first condition says that that for all voters the situation where investment is 
high is preferable to the one where investment is low, regardless of the policy chosen. 
Intuitively, this means that middle-income voters are better off in a thriving economy 
with capital-friendly policy than in a shrinking economy with a labor-friendly policy. The 
second condition says that ceteris paribus, voters prefer the labor friendly policy. It 111 
 
should be clear that we have made the assumption that all voters are principally wage 
earners and they do not earn profits. The owners of firms have mass zero.
61 
   The  function  ( , ) p sxcaptures the fact that voters seek to discipline or reward the 
incumbent party for policies that affect the economic performance of the economy and 
their individual economic condition.
62 
 Assumption  3:  
a) ( , ) p Lh> (,) p Eh and  ( , ) p Ll > (, ) p El  
b) ( , ) p sh≥ (,) p slfor alls 
   The first statement represents the psychological fact that, ceteris paribus, voters 
prefer voting for the incumbent if he follows the policy that they prefer, namely the labor 
friendly policy. The second statement says that voters reward the incumbent for 
encouraging investments and general prosperity in the economy. It is worth noting that 
this psychological effect is stronger than the willingness to reward or punish the 
incumbent for the chosen policy, because  ( , ) p Eh≥ (,) p Llwhich means that voters will 
reward an incumbent party for having achieved high investments, even if it follows an 
employer-friendly policy. As we shall show, despite this strong assumption, the 
incumbent party fails to choose employer friendly policy in the absence of a commitment 
device.  
                                                 
61 This only strengthens our final result that voters support the institution of campaign contributions. 
Including a rich group would complicate the model and weaken some of the assumptions, but would not 
change the results. 
62 This is justified if we consider the effect of the general economic conditions in the popularity of 
incumbents according to the models of retrospective voting. There is much evidence that shows that voters 
punish the incumbent party both for bad macroeconomic performance and individual low income in a 
retrospective manner: see Kramer (1971) and the surveys by Monroe (1979) and by Kiewiet and Rivers 
(1984). 112 
 
 The  parameter j σ  captures individual heterogeneity.  Voter j  has a specific 
individual preference for one of the two parties that does not depend on the expected 
policy of the two parties. This might be due to ideological preference or due to preference 




− where the support 
1
ϕ
  is large. The use of these parameter helps smooth the 
results.   
  Finally, the random parameterδ  represents the general popularity of the 
incumbent party relative to the challenger party that is unknown before the elections and 




⎧ ⎫ − ⎨ ⎬
⎩⎭
. The realization of δ can be affected by 
random elements of the political process, such as performance the final debate between 
the political leaders.  
 
3.3.3 The Institution of Campaign Contributions  
  To describe this institution without complicating the analysis too much, assume 
that the firm sector can finance the campaign of the incumbent or the challenger party – a 
decision that depends on the policy choice of the incumbent party. What the firm sector 
wants is the choice of policyE in stage two. Firms have the option, before stage two, to 
convey the message to the incumbent party that if it chooses a policyLthey will 
contribute the monetary amountc to partyC and if it chooses policyE they will 
contribute the amount c to partyI . Thus the incumbent party knows this before it 113 
 
chooses the policy. To provide this kind of incentives clearly makes sense and we shall 
not further discuss the choice of the optimum contribution scheme here. We also assume 
that the firms can commit in honoring their promise.  This can be justified if we interpret 
the group F as a long-run player, who is interested for reputation building, and the 
politicians as short-run players. 
  For simplicity, assume the aggregate popularity of the incumbent increases in a 
well-defined way with contribution money and this is the same for both groups of voters. 
In particular, a fixed monetary amountcto the campaign of the chosen party is 
contributed, and it has the psychological effect of adding a fixed amount  ( ) ec to the 
utility of all voters if the supported party gets elected. This is, for example, because they 
are used for persuasive television advertising, and thus they create a positive impression 
for this party.  








  This simply says that contributions have a substantial effect on the utility of 
voters, meaning, for example, that advertising is very persuasive. In particular, it is 
persuasive enough to induce voters to vote for the incumbent party despite the fact that it 






3.4 Equilibrium when Commitment is Possible  
  Illustrating the main ideas, let’s forget stage zero and the possibility of campaign 
contributions. We shall briefly consider the subgame in stages one to three only, without 
the possibility of campaign contributions. This is in order to show that that the theoretical 
argument about policy rules of Kydland and Prescott is valid in this case, but its 
enforcement is not trivial. Assume that commitment to a certain policy is costless. We 
want to examine whether, in this game, the incumbent party would be better off in the 
equilibrium with discretion or committing about the policy it will follow in stage two, 
before the investment decision in stage one, would improve its position.  
 Claim:  Under assumptions1and3, if the incumbent party commits to follow the 
employer-friendly policy in stage2, it improves its position relative to the case where it 
does not commit. If assumption 2additionally holds, then everybody is better of in this 
commitment equilibrium.  
  Proof/ Clearly, the equilibrium payoffs of the incumbent party depend only on the 
equilibrium probability of the incumbent party winning. Proposition 1 in the next section 
describes the equilibrium without commitment in this game. Using its results, we know 
that the probability of the incumbent winning is  ( ) PL=
1
2
θ + (,) p Ll. If, however, this 
party could commit, before the investment decision, to choose employer friendly policy 
in stage two, then assumption 1 ensures that  h x = and therefore the probability of its 
victory would be  () PE=
1
2
θ + (,) p Eh. So, the commitment outcome is preferable for 115 
 
the incumbent party by assumption 3(b). By assumption2, all voters are also better off 
with commitment that without commitment.   
  This is a strong result that affirms that rules are better that discretion, especially 
when it comes to capital taxation. The important issue here is how to achieve this result, 
or at least approximate it with some cost, when a direct contract stipulating the 
commitment arrangement is prohibited by law and any agreement is likely to bear the 
negative suspicions of corruption. As the theorem shows, campaign contributions are 
likely to achieve this outcome.  
 
3.5 Equilibrium when Direct Commitment is not Possible 
  For this section, consider the whole game, in stages zero through three.  
Theorem:  In the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the game all voters vote to allow 
for the institution of campaign contributions.  The equilibrium strategies for all players 
are: 
1.  The choice of all voters is to approve (a) private campaign contributions in stage 
zero. 
2.  The strategy ofF  in stage one ishl  (firms invest only if the institution has been 
approved). 
3.  The policy function of I in stage two is the following: (,) , (,) f ah E f al E ==  
(,) , (,) f rh Lfrl L == . This means that the incumbent follows the employer friendly 
policy when the institution of private campaign contributions has been approved and 
the labor friendly policy otherwise. 116 
 
  To prove this result we shall prove two propositions about the equilibria in the 
two subgames that start at stage one.  
 Proposition  1: In the subgame after voters reject the institution of campaign 
contribution at stage zero, under assumptions 1 and 3, there exists a unique subgame 
perfect equilibrium and the following pure strategies are equilibrium strategies forF ,I : 
•  l for F at stage one,  
•  LL for the incumbent party at stage 2 (the incumbent chooses a labor-friendly 
policy no matter the investment choice of the firms).  
 Proof/ Backward induction will be used. We shall start by considering the voting 
behavior at stage 3. The problem of voter j  is trivial. She votes for I  if the utility from 
doing so is greater that the utility from voting forC .  
(,) (,) j vsx psx σ δ ++ +  (,) vsx >⇒   
(,) 0 j psx σ δ ++ > ⇒  [( ,) ] j psx σ δ >− +  
     This holds for all voters. Therefore, givensandx, there will be a swing voter who is 
indifferent between voting for I and voting forC . The ideology parameter for this voter 
shall be * [( ,) ] j psx σ δ =− + . Clearly, all voters with ideological parameter more than  * j σ  




j φσ Π= − . 117 
 
 Since  δ is still random, what the incumbent wants is to maximize is his 








Π≥ =Pr{ [ ( , ) p sx φ + ]0 } δ ≥ Pr{ ( , )} p sx δ = ≥−  
  But given the distribution of the parameterδ , the probability that it exceeds a 
given number c is
1
2
cθ − . Finally, the probability of the incumbent winning given 
, sx already chosen isP =
1
2
θ + (,) p sx. 
  Now, at stage two, the incumbent party anticipates this behavior of voters and 
chooses the policy that maximizes its utility. Since its utility depends only on the result of 
the elections, it simply seeks to maximize its probability of being elected.  
If it chooses policyL, its probability of winning is  () PL=
1
2
θ + (,) p Lx. 
If it chooses policyE , its probability of winning is  ( ) PE=
1
2
θ + (,) p Ex. 
  Therefore, the incumbent party chooses the labor-friendly policy since by 
assumption 3(a),  () PL- () 0 PE > . The optimal strategy for I isLL, that is, choosing a 
labor-friendly policy no matter what. The firms rationally anticipate this, so they invest 
low in stage one, since assumption one implies that they would reduce their profits if they 
invested high. So the optimal strategy for F  is . l  QED 118 
 
  Note that the policy choice does not depend on the investment levelx. When the 
policy is considered, investment decisions are already made, and although they can make 
the incumbent party more popular, they cannot affect its optimal decision. This result is 
intuitive: the labor-friendly policy politically benefits the incumbent party since voters 
prefer this policy and the investment level is given. In a similar argument like in Kydland 
and Prescott, the government, in the absence of commitment, loses any control over the 
expectations of the firm sector, which are 
e sL = no matter what. 
 Proposition  2: Under assumptions1,3and4, there is a unique subgame perfect 
equilibrium in the subgame where the institution of legal contributions is approved at 
stage 0 , and the following pure strategies are equilibrium strategies forF ,I : 
•  For F at stage one,  x h =  
•  For the incumbent party at stage two,EE  
 Proof/Again, backward induction is used. In this setting, the preferences of voters 
in stage 3 depend on the policy for one additional reason: choosingsE = implies 
thatF contribute to the campaign of the incumbent, and sL =  implies thatF contributes 
to the campaign of the challenger party.  
 So,  ifsE = , the utility function for agent j is: 
(,, , ) (,) (,) () jj j us x v s x p s x e c σ δσ δ =++ + +      , if I wins. 
(,, , ) (,) jj us x v s x σ δ =                                           , if C wins. 








If sL = the utility function for agent j is: 
(,, , ) (,) (,) jj j us x v s x p s x σ δσ δ =++ +      , if I wins. 
(,, , ) (,) () jj us x v s x e c σ δ =+                        , if C wins. 
  The probability of I winning is  '( ) PL=
1
2
θ + {(,) () } p Lx ec − . 
  Again, the incumbent party, anticipating the behavior of voters in stage three and 
hence these probabilities, will follow the employer friendly policy if  '( ) PE '( ) 0 PL −≥ , 
which implies that2 ( ) ec ≥ (,) (,) p Lx pEx − . This holds by assumption 3, which says that 
the effect of campaign contributions in persuading voters is large. Thus, the incumbent 
party, under this contribution schedule of the firm sector, maximizes its reelection 
probabilities if it chooses the employer-friendly policy at stage 2. Once again, the 
optimal strategy of party I does not depend on whether investments took place or not in 
stage one. We conclude that under legal campaign contributions the optimal strategy for 
the incumbent party in stage 2 isEE. Finally, rationally anticipating this, the firm sector 
shall invest high in stage one by assumption 1.  QED 
  The second and third parts of the theorem have already been proven. To prove 
part one, notice that the equilibrium payoffs of voters at stage 2 in the subgame with 
contributions is  ( , ) vEh and in the subgame without contributions it is ( , ) vLl.
63 From 
                                                 
63 We assume that the utility stemming from the election result, that is, all other components of the utility 
functions are small relative to the realized economic payoff of period two. These are of course important 
for determining the electorate preferences of voters, but not a significant component of overall utility.  120 
 
assumption two,  ( , ) vEh≥ (,) vLl so voters are better off, if they approve the institution 
of campaign contributions at stage 0 . This proves the theorem.  
 
3.6 Discussion 
  The plausibility of assumption 4 should be discussed because there is an 
important debate regarding the importance of money and media in politics. Conventional 
wisdom is that money buys important political influence. This conviction is so strong that 
Gary Becker, in his influential work about pressure groups competing for political 
influence (1983), p.392, did not include voting at all. He justifies this by the following:  
  “[I] … have presented a theory of rational political behavior, yet [I] have hardly mentioned 
voting. This neglect is not accidental because I believe that voter preferences are frequently not a crucial, 
independent force in political behavior. These ‘preferences’ can be manipulated and created through the 
information and misinformation provided by interested pressure groups[…]”  
  (The emphasis by the author). This is just an example of the conviction that most 
people and scholars share, that is, that interest groups have strong effects on voting.  
After all, parties spend important amounts of money for political campaigning. It comes 
as a surprise, therefore that social scientists have not managed to substantiate the 
importance of media exposure and campaigning for voter preferences, which are found to 
have “minimal consequences”. Moreover, authors like Snyder, Ansolabehere and 
Figueiredo (2003) argue that money is not very important in politics in the sense that 
large contributors do not seem to be successfully “investing” in contributions. Their basic 
argument is that the amount of money spent on campaign contributions does not even 
reach the legal limits and is dwarfed by the amounts of money at stake when economic 121 
 
policy is decided. At the same time, the bulk of campaign contribution money in the US 
originates from small contributors. They conclude that money cannot buy that much 
influence.  
  However, this inability has been the result of methodological and conceptual 
limitations, as many authors have shown, and the results of experimental studies have 
been reinforcing the view of important, rather than minimal, effects of campaigns. Bartels 
(1993) claims that data and methodology limitations have prevented social science from 
capturing the apparent importance of media effects. He proposes ways to fix this using a 
model of informative campaigning with estimation of errors. Iyengar and Simon, (2000) 
ascribe the inability of academic research to demonstrate the effects of political 
campaigning to both methodological and theoretical problems. These include some of the 
typical disadvantages of survey studies, (in particular that measuring “media exposure” is 
prone to bias and error), the fact that media effects exist in a large span of time, and the 
fact that they interact with the previous positions of voters in complex ways. They also 
claim that the conventional conceptual approach to campaign effects is excessively 
restrictive and if all effects are taken into account the real importance of campaigns is 
revealed. To all these we have to add the large literature that shows that special interests 
contribute as if they expect something in return, results which even Snyder, Ansolabehere 
and Figueiredo (2003) accept. Summing up, we believe that the effects of money and 
media effects are significant, although they cannot easily be substantiated. 
  The assumption of non-partisan politicians is not critical. The results of the model 
would not change if elections were between partisan politicians and in particular a left-122 
 
wing partisan candidate and a right-wing partisan candidate. In such a case, the two 
candidates have a strong incentive to follow their preferences no matter what they have 
promised. Assuming a single group with middle-income voters simplifies the analysis but 
is not necessary for the results. On the contrary, relaxing it would strengthen the results: 
if a second group of rich voters, who prefer the employer-friendly policy even in the short 
run, was assumed, then the critical assumption4 would be weakened. This is because the 
psychological effect of advertising would not have to counter the whole effect of 
preference for the labor-friendly policy, because the rich voters would prefer the 
employer-friendly policy. Of course, the relative political clout of the rich group would 
determine the necessary size of the contribution effect ( ) ec. 
  In what types of polities are the results in this paper likely to apply, and thus the 
insights from our model instructive? The existence of problems of time inconsistency, 
especially with respect to capital taxation and macroeconomic stability, seems to warrant 
commitment solutions. Hence, countries with strong left parties and a tradition of populist 
governance are more likely to require devices such as the one described in this paper for 
promoting investments. For example, some Mediterranean European countries like Spain, 
Portugal and Greece have a tradition of political tension between left and right with a 
strong left
64 and a relatively low ability to achieve cooperation.
65  In these counties, the 
transition into a regime of stable economic policy has taken place in an era with much 
more important role of private television in electoral campaigns. Presumably, this 
                                                 
64 See Golden(1986).    
65 The Mediterranean countries, especially Greece, seem to have low levels of social capital. See 
Christoforou (2003) and Tsakalotos and Lyberaki (2002). 123 
 
significantly increased the potential for electoral influence of the private sector. It may 
seem that the institution of private campaign contribution can serve as an appropriate tool 
for economic policy change and growth in such cases. The second example that we shall 
present describes the case of Greece.  
  Furthermore, the importance of the commitment device we are proposing depends 
on the ability of a society to coordinate, or social capital. For example, the small Nordic 
democracies of Europe (Sweden, Denmark, and Finland) have a strong ability of policy 
coordination at the economy-wide level and they also score high in social capital indices. 
This political coordination system, corporatism, decreases the need for other commitment 
devices. Hence, it is not a surprise for our model, that campaign contributions and media 
influence of firms do not play a serious role in politics in these countries. Finally, it is 
worth noting that our model has something to say even for countries that do not seem to 
have a current policy credibility problem, such as the United States. In particular, it may 
explain why this institution emerged in the first place. As our first example illustrates, the 
historic circumstances where this happened may well be similar with the contemporary 
conditions in countries that use this commitment device.   
 
3.7 Examples 
3.7.1 The US Example 
  We argue that the economic prosperity achieved in the U.S. after 1896 was 
achieved with the help of the commitment device this paper discusses. In particular, the 
ability of the firms to contribute to the party that promised to maintain the gold standard 124 
 
guaranteed the economic and financial stability of this international monetary system and 
this contributed to the good condition of U.S. economy. Adam Winkler (2004) 
underscores the effect of firm contributions in the US elections of 1896, where William 
Jennings Bryan ran a campaign based on the populist platform of free silver. Cited from 
Winkler: 
 “ Bryan's proposal to move the dollar off the gold standard and allow free coinage of silver 
profoundly worried major industrial and financial concerns, which believed free silver to be a risky 
monetary policy that would endanger the economy. Playing upon those fears, McKinley's campaign 
chairman, Hanna, pushed the heads of major corporations and other business combines to donate 
generously to the Republican campaign – ‘assessments’ based on the size of their capitalization and their 
"stake in the general prosperity."  Standard Oil, the largest corporation of its day, was asked to pay $ 
250,000” 
  Indeed, many economic and financial interests seriously worried about the 
proposals of the populists, and most analysts, including Irving Fisher and Milton 
Friedman, agreed that the monetary policy of the populists was indeed problematic. 
Friedman (1990) discusses the scholarly views on the subject of bimetallism and on the 
actual proposals of the populists. He notes that even scholars who in theory supported 
bimetallism rejected the specific proposals of the time. Friedman himself said about the 
policies of the populists ( pp. 95-96):  
  “ While I believe that 16:1 was feasible for the U.S. in 1873, by 1893 it was surely too late to undo 
the damage : Bryan may have been trying to close the barn door after the horse has been stolen”.  
   This was the period of one of the worst depressions in American history, and this 
uncertainty about money made things worse. In the framework of our model, investments 
in the economy would be particularly low in the absence of campaign contributions. This 125 
 
is because by catering for the interests of the middle income group, mainly farmers, the 
Democratic-populist candidate would increase his probably of winning. However, with 
campaign contributions the incumbent party was able to commit on continued adherence 
to the gold standard, alleviating the fears of the firms and winning the election. The 
prosperity that followed indicates that the commitment device worked. The economic 
conditions following the victory of the Republicans were extremely good
66 and it can be 
claimed that there was an amazing reversal of fortune for the U.S. economy. Although 
other factors may have also contributed to this success, a large part of the good economic 
outcomes can be attributed to the feelings of monetary and financial stability that the 
preservation of the gold standard created. Even scholars, who do not believe that the 
preservation of the gold standard was a sufficient policy for this success, admit that the 
stability it achieved was necessary.   
  Furthermore, the economic regime that Hanna’s efforts and firms’ campaign 
contributions help protect can be safely characterized as one of commitment and 
macroeconomic stability. Bordo and Rockoff (1996) underscore the importance of the 
gold standard as a commitment mechanism for financial discipline as well as for 
achieving beneficial terms of international financing. According to their account, when a 
country held firm the gold standard despite the vicissitudes of economic conditions this 
gave the European countries of the financial core a clear message about the stability of 
the country, which thus achieved good borrowing conditions. In addition to that, 
                                                 
66 Noyes (1905) offers a good account of his county’s contemporary achievements: “How the United States 
managed so to reverse its position in the past ten years that, instead of the crippled industrial and financial 
state of 1894…we have seen in the short space of half a dozen years, a community whose prosperity had 
become the puzzle of the outside world…” 126 
 
maintaining the gold standard was critical for the international economic relations of the 
country. Rosenberg (1985) emphasizes “gold standard diplomacy” in the period after 
1900 as an important part of the policies that the US followed to increase its international 
influence. 
  It is worth noting that one need not engage in the debate about the monetary plan 
of the populists. Since the private sector’s expectations were formed on the basis of the 
conviction that Bimetallism was a precarious monetary system, this would be enough to 
deter investments. Finally, we should note that this is a vastly simplified account of a 
very complicated historical fact, one of the most debated elections in American history, 
but it provides a useful way to think about it. 
 
3.7.2 The Greek Example  
  The second example concerns the change in economics policy of the Greek liberal 
party PASOK (Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement).
 67 Greece was doing relatively poorly 
economically in the 1980’s, when the dominant party, PASOK did not have long run 
relationships with the private sector.
68 On the other hand, the recovery of the economy 
starts from the period where the first traces of increasing corporate political influence 
appear. In the 1990’s, the same party, PASOK, implemented a much different economic 
policy, achieving macroeconomic stability and high growth, at the same period when 
                                                 
67 Greece is a country with strong tradition of political polarization and, at the same time, lack of social 
capital sufficient to achieve coordination of the corporatist type (see Golden 1986 p. and Featherstone 
2005, p.232). This means that in Greece social cooperation is hard to achieve. 
68 Corruption scandals, such as the Koskotas’ great scandal only involved publicly held corporations. 127 
 
accusations of corruption became widespread.
69 We argue that the change in economic 
policy of PASOK can be attributed to a change into a commitment regime after 1993 
generated by campaign contributions in kind (media support). 
In the 1980’s populist leader Papandreou’s party, PASOK, governed for eight 
years following an economic policy that has been heavily criticized, especially with 
regard to issues related with the protection of property rights and for failing to achieve 
positive corporate environment and macroeconomic stability (see Bosworth and 
Kollintzas, 2001). In the late 1980s’ increasing international pressures for a free media 
world persuaded Greek politicians to institutionalize private media. We argue that this 
change in the media allowed for a higher influence of strong interests in elections, which 
served as a commitment device for PASOK. Greek elections were transformed to media-
controlled “couch elections” according to Greek reporters. Yannas (2001) discusses the 
significant increase in the party spending for television advertising: in the election of 
1990, PASOK spent 6.7% of its advertising expenditures for television advertising. After 
1993, this percentage surpasses 75% Yannas (2001, p.4).  
In 1990-1993 the conservative New Democracy party governed, under the 
leadership of Konstantinos Mitsotakis, a fervent opponent of Papandreou’s polices. This 
party followed a policy for economic adjustment with radical steps: rapid privatization, 
changes in social spending, labor market changes, and more. The result was that labor 
union opposition was so great that the economy could not operate. This government was 
overthrown in 1993 by the influence of, according to the prime minister himself, special 
                                                 
69 In fact, one of the major campaign promises of the winning 2004 party, New Democracy, was that 
corruption of the form of media and business interest political influence cannot be tolerated any longer. 128 
 
interests related to corruption. The interpretation one can make of this is that the rightist 
government was so inefficient that the private sector preferred the PASOK government, 
which under the force of the new, media-driven political race, would be willing to reach a 
long-run relationship with them. Macroeconomic stability and greater protection of 
property rights is something that business firms would require from the government, and 
now PASOK did not feel it could win elections only with the famous appeal of its 
charismatic leader Papandreou, but had to increase its political campaign spending and 
get control of the media.   
   PASOK won the elections in 1993 and governed for 11 consecutive years. The 
kind of economic policy adopted was stabilizing and conservative and the economy 
attained the satisfaction of the macroeconomic criteria for joining the European Union in 
1999. Featherstone (2005) surveys the key components of Prime Minister Simitis’ 
“modernization” project: privatization, labor market reform, smaller and more efficient 
state, and macroeconomic stability. Throughout this period of 11 years corruption and 
corporate influence accusations resounded in the Greek political life.
70  
This historical example can be very accurately depicted in our setting. Before the 
change in the media sector in 1989, television advertising did not exist, so the effects of 
campaign contributions were insignificant: () ecwas very low for any c. Accordingly, 
campaign contributions played no role before 1989. PASOK had an advantage and won, 
                                                 
70  It is worth noting that in a very influential paper about the Greek economy, Alogoskoufis - in 
Alogoskoufis, Giavazzi, and Laroque, (1995) - argues that the bad performance in the Greek economy in 
the period 1974-93, compared to the period 1954-1973, was due to the change in economic regimes. He 




choosing labor-friendly policy, and at the same time, investment was low, exactly as our 
model predicts. The electoral defeats of 1989-1990 were a special case due to massive 
scandals and the general desire of the public for political catharsis. After PASOK got 
reelected in the early nineties, private television was a reality and  ( ) ecwas high enough 
so that assumption 4 was satisfied. As our model predicts, the chosen policy was capital-
friendly, investment was high and PASOK apparently enjoyed the support of the biggest 
media owners and editors, and was thus reelected twice.  
 
3.8 Conclusions 
  We used a model to examine how the institutionalization of legal corporate 
campaign contributions can ameliorate the credibility problem in economic policy and 
achieve something close to the commitment outcome (at some cost). We concluded that 
this could be achieved under some assumptions regarding the importance of campaign 
contributions for shaping political preferences. This result is more relevant for specific 
democracies, especially those prone to opportunistic political manipulation and 
insufficient social capital. We illustrated this by presenting two examples. First, we 
showed how our framework could shed some new light one important electoral race of 
the USA, the famous “populist versus republicans” race of 1896. In our framework, 
Hanna’s much criticized collection of corporate contributions may have helped the 
economy attain its good results in the following decade. Then we discussed the example 
of Greece; a country plagued by economic instability in the 1980’s which experienced an 
impressive reversal of its economic policies in the 1990’s under the same party. We 130 
 
attribute this reversal partly to the increase in the electoral influence of corporate interests 
because of the changes in the media landscape.  
  The practical significance of the results of this paper is that the existence of a 
strong influence of the corporate sector in many countries can be understood under the 
view of economic efficiency attained with this institution. It must be emphasized that this 
analysis does not imply that any society should permit unlimited electoral influence of 
corporate interests. It just gives one argument for the possible economic efficiency of 
institutions that allows for some influence. The criticisms mentioned in the introduction 
may well be valid and, depending on the value system of a society, they may weight 
much more heavily that economic efficiency. Political equality and transparency are two 
principles that have great importance in their own merit, which should not be judged by 














  Akerlof, George and William Dickens. “The Economic Consequences of 
Cognitive   Dissonance.” The American Economic Review, Vol. 72, No. 3, June 1982, 
pp. 307-319.  
  Alesina, Alberto. “Credibility and Policy Convergence in Two-Party System 
with Rational Voters.” The American Economic Review, Vol. 8, No. 4, September 
1988, pp. 786-805. 
  Alesina, Alberto. “Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated 
Game.”  The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 102, No. 3, August 1987, pp. 651-
678.  
  Alogoskoufis, George, Francesco Giavazzi and Guy Laroque. “The Two Phases 
of Janus: Institutions, Policy Regimes, and Macroeconomic Performance in Greece.” 
Economic Policy, Vol. 10, No 20, April 1995, pp. 147-192.  
  Ansolabehere, Stephen, John de Figueiredo and James Snyder. “Why Is There 
so Little Money in US Politics?” The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol.17, No. 1, 
Winter 2003, pp. 105-130.  
  Ansolabehere, Stephen, Erik Snowberg and James Snyder. “Television and the 
Incumbency Advantage in US Elections.” Mimeo, July 2004.  
  Ball, Sheryl, Catherine Eckel, Phillip Grossman and William Zame. “Status in 
Markets.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 116, 2001, pp. 161-188. 132 
 
  Banerjee, Abhijit. “A Simple Model of Herd Behavior.” The Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, Vol. 107, No. 3, August 1992, pp. 797-817.  
  Bartels, Larry. “Messages Received: The Political Impact of Media  Exposure.”  
The American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 2, June 1993, pp. 267-285. 
  Battigalli, Pierpaolo and Martin Dufwenberg. “Guilt in Games.” AEA Papers 
and Proceedings, Vol. 97, No. 2, May 2007, pp. 170-176. 
  Becker, Gary. “A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political 
Influence.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 98, No. 3, August 1983, pp. 371-
400.  
  Berg, Joyce, John Dickhaut and Kevin McCabe. “Trust, Reciprocity and Social 
History.” Games and Economic Behavior 10, 1995, pp. 122-142. 
 Bikhchandani,  Sushil,  David Hirshleifer and Ivo Welch. “A Theory of Fads, 
Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades.” The Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol. 100, No. 5, October 1992, pp. 992-1026. 
  Bohnet, Iris and Richard Zeckhauser. “Social Comparisons in Ultimatum 
Bargaining”. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 106(3), 2004, pp. 495-510.  
  Bordo, Michael and Hugh Rockoff. “The Gold Standard as a Housekeeping Seal 
of Approval.” The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 56, No. 2, June 1996, pp. 389-
428.  
  Bosworth, Barry and Tryphon Kollintzas. “Economic Growth in Greece: Past 
Performance and Future Prospects.” June 2001, CERP Discussion Paper No. 2852.  
  Camerer, Colin and Keith Weigelt. “Experimental Tests of a Sequential 
Equilibrium Reputation Model.” Econometrica, Vol. 56, No. 1, January 1988, pp. 1-36.  133 
 
  Cheung, Yin-Wong and Daniel Friedman. “Individual Learning in Normal Form 
Games: Some Laboratory Results.” Games and Economic Behavior 19, 1997, pp. 46-
76.  
  Christoforou, Asimina. “Social Capital and Economic Growth: the Case of 
Greece.” Paper Presented at the 1
st Symposium on Social Science Research in Greece of 
the Hellenic Observatory, June 2002. 
  Cialdini, Robert B. and Noah Goldstein. “Social Influence: Compliance and 
Conformity.” Annual Review of Psychology 55, 2004, pp. 591-621.  
  Coate, Stephen. “Pareto Improving Campaign Finance Policy.” The American 
Economic Review, Vol. 94, No.3, June 2004, pp. 628-655.  
  Coate, Stephen. “Political Competition with Campaign Contributions and 
Informative Advertising.” Mimeo, December 2001. 
  D’ Agostino, Ralph, Warren Chase, and Albert Belanger. “The Appropriateness 
of Some Common Procedures for Testing the Equality of Two Independent Binomial 
Populations.” The American Statistician, Vol. 42, No. 3, August 1988, pp. 198-202.  
  Daremas, Georgios and Georgios Terzis. “Televisualization of the Politics in 
Greece.” International Communication Gazette, Vol. 62 (2), 2000, pp. 217-231. 
  Dimitras, Panagiote, E. “Greece: a New Danger.” Foreign Policy, No. 58, Spring 
1985, pp. 134-150. 
  Dixit, Avinash. “The Making of Economic Policy, a Transaction Cost Politics 
Perspective.” The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1996. 134 
 
  Dixit, Avinash; Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman. “Common Agency and 
Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making.” The 
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 105, No. 4, August 1997, pp. 752-769.  
  Dufwenberg, Martin and Uri Gneezy. “Information Disclosure in Auctions: an 
Experiment.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 48, 2002, pp. 431-
444.  
  Esponda, Ignacio. “Information Feedback in First Price Auctions.” NYU 
Mimeo, November 2006.  
  Featherstone, Kevin . “Introduction: ‘Modernization’ and the Structural 
Constraints of Greek Politics.” West European Politics, Vol. 28, No. 2, March 2005, pp. 
223-241. 
  Fey, Mark, Richard McKelvey and Thomas Palfrey. “An Experimental Study of 
Constant –Sum Centipede Games.”  International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 25, No. 
4, 1996, pp. 269-287.  
  Frey, Bruno and Stephan Meier. “Social Comparisons and Pro-social Behavior. 
Testing ‘Conditional Cooperation’ in a Field Experiment.” The American Economic 
Review, Vol. 94, No. 5, December 2004, pp. 1717-1722.  
  Frieden, Jeffrey. “Monetary Populism in Nineteenth-Century America:  An 
Open Economy Interpretation.” The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 57, No. 2, June 
1997, pp. 367-395. 
  Friedman, Daniel. “Equilibrium in Evolutionary Games: Some Experimental 
Results.” The Economic Journal, Vol. 106, No. 434, January 1996, pp. 1-25. 135 
 
  Friedman, Milton. “Bimetallism Revisited.” The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, Vol. 4, No. 4, Fall 1990, pp. 85-104. 
  Fudenberg Drew and David K. Levine “Measuring Players’ loses in 
Experimental Games.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 112, May 1997, No. 
2, pp. 507-536.  
  Fudenberg Drew and David K. Levine. “The Theory of Learning in Games.” 
The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1996. 
  Fudenberg, Drew and David K. Levine. “Superstition and Rational Learning.” 
2005, Mimeo.  
  Fudenberg, Drew and David K. Levine. “Self-Confirming Equilibrium.” 
Econometrica, Vol. 61, May 1993, No. 3, pp. 523-545.  
  Fudenberg, Drew and David K Levine. “Steady-State Learning and Nash 
Equilibrium.” Econometrica, Vol. 61, May 1993, No. 3, pp. 547-573.   
  Fukuyama, Francis. “Social Capital and Development: The Coming Agenda.” 
SAIS Review, Vol. 22, No. 1, Winter-Spring 2002, pp. 23-37.  
  Fukuyama, Francis. “Social Capital, Civil Society and Development.” Third 
World Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 1, 2001, pp. 7-20. 
  Golden, Miriam. “Interest Representation, Party Systems and the State: Italy in 
Comparative Perspective.” Comparative Politics, April 1986, pp. 279-301.   
  Grossman, Gene and Elhanan Helpman. “Special Interest Politics.” MIT Press, 
Massachusetts, 2001.  136 
 
  Guth, Werner, Peter Ockenfels and Markus Wendel. “Cooperation Based on 
Trust: an Experimental Investigation.” Journal of Economic Psychology 18, 1997, pp. 
15-43.  
  Haber, Stephen, Armando Razo, and Noel Maurer. “The Politics of Property 
Rights, Political Instability, Credible Commitments, and Economic Growth in Mexico, 
1876-1929.” Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2003. 
  Hallin, Daniel C. and Stylianos Papathanassopoulos. “Political Clientelism and 
the Media:  Southern Europe and Latin America in Comparative Perspective.” Media, 
Culture and Society, Vol. 24, 2002, pp. 175-195. 
  Hargreaves–Heap, Shaun and Yanis Varoufakis. “Some Experimental Evidence 
on the Evolution of Discrimination, Cooperation and Perceptions of Fairness.” The 
Economic Journal, Vol. 112, July 2002, pp. 679-703. 
  Harrison, Glenn and Kevin McCabe. “Expectations and Fairness in a Simple 
Bargaining Experiment.” International Journal of Game Theory 25, 1996, pp. 303-327.  
  Hayes, Alexander D . “The Recent Economic History of the United States.”  The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 19, No. 2, February 1905, pp. 167-209.  
  Iyengar, Shanto and Adam Simon.  “New Perspectives and Evidence on 
Political Communication and Campaign Effects.” Annual Review of Psychology, Vol. 
51, February 2000, pp. 149-169.  
  Jackson, Matthew, and Ehud Kalai. “Social Learning in Recurring Games.” 
Games and Economic Behavior 21, 1997, pp. 102-134.  
  Kalai, Ehud, and Ehud Lehrer. “Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium.” 
Econometrica, Vol. 61, No. 5, September 1993, pp. 1019-1045.  137 
 
  Kau, James, Donald Keenan, and Paul Rubin. “A General Equilibrium Model of 
Congressional Voting.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 97, No. 2, May 1982, 
pp. 271-293.  
  Kiewiet, Roderick and Douglas Rivers. “A Retrospective on Retrospective 
Voting.” Political Behavior, Vol. 6, No. 4, 1984, pp. 369-393. 
  Kramer, Gerard H. “Short-Term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior, 1896-
1964.” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 65, No. 1, March 1971, pp. 131-
143.  
  Kynland, Finn and Edward Prescott. “Rules Rather than Discretion: The 
Inconsistency of Optimal Plans.” The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 85, June 1977,  
pp. 473-492. 
  Levine, David K. “Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments.” Review of 
Economic Dynamics 1, 1998, pp. 593-622.  
  Levitt, Stephen. “Policy Watch: Congressional Campaign Finance Reform.” The 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 9, No. 1, Winter 1995, pp. 183-193.  
  Mailath, George. “Do people Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons from 
Evolutionary Game Theory.” Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 36 No. 3, September 
1998, pp. 1347-1374.  
  Marks, Gary and Norman Miller. “Ten Years of Research on the False-Consensus 
Effect: An Empirical and Theoretical Review.” Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 102, 1987, pp. 72-
90.  
  McKelvey, Richard and Thomas Palfrey. “An Experimental Study of the 
Centipede Game.” Econometrica, Vol. 60 No. 4, July 1992, pp. 803-836.   138 
 
  McKelvey, Richard and Thomas Palfrey. “Quantal Response Equilibria for Extensive 
Form Games.” Experimental Economics 1, 1998, pp. 9-41.  
  Michalos, Alex. “Ethical Considerations Regarding Public Opinion Polling 
During Election Campaigns.” Journal of Business Ethics 10, 1991, pp. 403-422.  
  Monroe, Kirsten. “Econometric Analyses of Electoral Behavior: A Critical 
Review.” Political Behavior, Vol. 1, No. 2, June 1979, pp. 137-173. 
  Morwitz, Vicky G. and Carol Pluzinski. “Do Polls Reflect Opinions or Do 
Opinions Reflect Polls? The Impact of Political Polling on Voters’ Expectations, 
Preferences, and Behavior.” Journal of Consumer Research, Vol. 23, June 1996, pp. 53-
67.  
  Murphy, Ryan, Amnon Rappoport and James Parco.  “The Breakdown of 
Cooperation in Iterative Real-Time Trust Dilemmas.” Experimental Economics 9, 2006, 
pp. 147-166. 
  Nagel, Rosemary and Fang Fang Tang. “Experimental Results on the Centipede 
Game in Normal Form: An Investigation on Learning.” Journal of Mathematical 
Psychology 42, 1998, pp. 356-384. 
  Ortmann, Andreas, John Fitzgerald and Carl Boeing. “Trust, Reciprocity and 
Social History: a Re-examination.” Experimental Economics 3, 2000, pp. 81-100.  
  Oxoby, Robert. “Cognitive Dissonance, Status and Growth of the Underclass.” 
The Economic Journal 114, October 2004, pp. 727-749.  
  Person, Torsten and Guido Tabellini. “Political Economics: Explaining 
Economic Policy”. MIT Press, Massachusetts, 2000. 139 
 
  Prat, Andrea. “An Economic Analysis of Campaign Finance.” Mimeo, October 
1999. 
  Przeworsky, Adam and Michael Wallerstein. “The Structure of Class Conflict in 
Democratic Capitalist Societies.” American Political Science Review, Vol. 76, June 
1982, pp. 215-238. 
  Przeworsky, Adam and Michael Wallerstein. “Structural Dependence of the 
State on Capital.” American Political Science Review, March 1988, Vol. 82, pp. 11-29. 
  Putnam, Robert. “Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital”, Journal 
of Democracy, 6.1, 1995, pp. 65-78.  
  Rabin, Matthew. “Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics.” The 
American Economic Review, December 1993, pp. 1281-1302.  
  Rappoport, Amnon, William Stein, James Parco and Nicholas Thomas. 
“Equilibrium Play and Adaptive Learning in a Three-Person Centipede Game.” Games 
and Economic Behavior 43, 2003, pp. 239-265.  
  Roberts, John and Keith Legg. “Political Strategies for Economic Manipulation: 
Democratic Election in Greece, 1960-1985.” The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 44, 
No. 1, March 1991, pp. 39-65.  
  Rockoff, Hugh. “The ‘Wizard of Oz’ as a Monetary Allegory.” The Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol. 98, No. 4, August 1990, pp.739-760. 
  Rosenberg, Emily. “Foundations of United States International Financial Power: 
Gold Standard Diplomacy, 1900-1905.” The Business History Review, Vol. 59, No. 2, 
Summer 1985, pp 169-202.  140 
 
  Roth, Alvin and Francoise Schoumaker. “Expectations and Reputations in 
Bargaining: An Experimental Study.” The American Economic Review, Vol. 73, No. 3, 
June 1983, pp. 362-372.  
  Sahai, Hardeo and Adwer Khurshid. “On Analysis of Epidemiological Data 
Involving a 2x2 Contingency Table: An Overview of Fisher’s Exact Test and Yates’ 
Correction for Continuity.” Journal of Biopharmaceutical Statistics 5 (1), 1995, pp. 43-
70.  
  Schultz, Christian. “Strategic Campaigns and Redistributive Politics”. Mimeo, 
September 2003.  
  Sims, Judy Rene. “Pluralism as Diaploki: The Interplay of Politicians with 
Media Owners in Greek Radio Broadcasting.” Journal of Radio Studies, Winter 2003. 
  Snyder, James and Michael Ting. “Interest Groups and the Electoral Control of 
Politicians.” Mimeo, February 2005. 
  Tsakalotos, Euclid. “The Political Economy of Social Democratic Economic 
Policies: The PASOK Experiment in Greece.” Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 
1998, Vol. 14, Number 1, pp. 114-138. 
  Tsakalotos, Euclid and Antigone Lyberaki. “Reforming the Economy without 
Society: Social and Institutional Constraints to Economic Reform in post-1974 Greece.” 
New Political Economy, Vol.7, No. 1, 2002, pp. 93-114. 
  Voulgaris, Yiannis. “Greece of the-Post Dictatorship Period: 1974-1990: Stable 
Democracy Marked by the History of this Era.” Themelio Press, Athens, 2002. 
  Weibull, Jorgen. “Evolutionary Game Theory.” The MIT Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1997. 141 
 
  Winkler, Adam. “Other People's Money: Corporations, Agency Costs, and 
Campaign Finance Law.” Georgetown Law Journal, June 2004. 
  Zauner, Klaus G. “A Payoff Uncertainty Explanation of Results in Experimental 
Centipede Games.”  Games and Economic Behavior 26, 1999, pp. 157-185.   
 
 
 
 